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THE EMPLOYER'S DUTY TO BARGAIN OVER LAY-
OFFS IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY: HOW THE




QINCE THE enactment of the Airline Deregulation Act
of 1978,1 labor struggles in the airline industry have
frequently made front page headlines. These problems
have persisted for almost ten years, and there is no sign of
imminent resolution.2 In fact, the airlines have been hit
by many events which strain labor relations, including
strikes, bankruptcies,3 and mergers. One example of this
turbulence was an attempt by several carriers to survive
fierce competition resulting from deregulation by lower-
* University of Athens Law School (LL.B. 1987); University of Pennsylvania
Law School (LL.M. 1988, S.J.D. 1990). This article is a modified version of one
chapter of the author's doctoral (S.J.D.) thesis on airline labor law. The entire
thesis is reserved at the Library of the Law School of the University of Penn-
sylvania. The author would like to express his gratitude to Professor Clyde Sum-
mers for his insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
, Airline Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified
as amended in 49 U.S.C. (1982)).
2The 1989 pilot's strike at Eastern Airlines ("Eastern") is just the most recent
example of this persistent phenomenon. See Shribman, Classic Struggle--Strike at
Eastern Tests Ability of Big Labor to Re-Establish Itself, Wall St. J., March 6, 1989, at 1,
col. 1; see also Bradsher, Eastern's Pilot Union Ends Strike, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1989,
at DI, col. I (describing the bitterness of this continuing nine month strike).
3 See Papaioannou, The Duty to Bargain and Reection of Collective Agreements by a
Bankrupt Airline: Trying to Reconcile the R.L.A. with the Bankruptcy Code, 18 TRANSP.
L.J. - (1990) (page number unavailable at press time).
4 See Eastern Strike Prompting Worry on Deregulation, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1989, at
26 (discussing how 19 major air carriers operating before the 1978 deregulation
merged into eight carriers by 1988, controlling 92.8% of the market).
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ing labor costs and reducing labor forces.5  Not surpris-
ingly, airline labor unions responded by demanding
collective bargaining. Unfortunately, the resulting dis-
putes between airlines and their unions were not settled
through collective bargaining, but were "resolved" in the
courts.6
The primary issue facing the courts in this litigation was
whether the Railway Labor Act (RIA or the Act), 7 gov-
erning labor relations in the airline and railroad indus-
tries, imposes a duty on employers to bargain over
employee lay-offs. While the duty to bargain over lay-offs
has been thoroughly discussed by legal scholars in the
context of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),8 a
lack of familiarity with the RLA among legal scholars has
resulted in a shortage of literature on the subject.9 In
fact, this lack of familiarity is also apparent in the courts.
For example, courts tend to apply NLRA principles in
RLA cases without realizing the differences between the
two statutes and the problems such a misapplication of
principles creates.' 0
- See Cassell & Spencer, Airline Labor Relations Under Dereguations [sic] :Oligopoly to
Competition-And Return? (paper published by the Transportation Center of North-
western University 1986); Cappelli, Competitive Pressures and Labor Relations in the
Airline Industry, 24 INDUS. REL. 316 (1985).
6 Katz, The American Experience Under the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978-An Airline
Perspective, 6 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 87, 97 (1988).
7 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1982).
8 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1982); see P. MISCIMARRA, THE NLRB AND MANAGERIAL
DISCRETION: PLANT CLOSINGS, RELOCATIONS, SUBCONTRACTING, AND AUTOMATION
(1983); Harper, Leveling the Road from Borg Warner to First National Maintenance. The
Scope of Mandatory Bargaining, 68 VA. L. REV. 1447 (1982); Sockell, The Scope of
Mandatory Bargaining.- A Critique and a Proposal, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 19
(1986); Comment, Major Operational Decisions and Free Collective Bargaining: Eliminat-
ing the Mandatory/Permissive Distinction, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1971 (1989).
9 In fact, there seems to be only two articles, both expressing identical views,
available for review on the subject: Campbell & Hiers, Management Decisions to Close
or Sell Part or All of the Enterprise Under the Railway Labor Act-The Air Carrier's Di-
lemma, 14 EMPL. REL. LJ. 327 (1988); McDonald, Airline Management Prerogative in
the Deregulation Era, 52 J. AIR L. & COM. 869 (1987). (During publication of this
article, the following Comment addressing similar issues was published: Com-
ment, Merging the RLA and the NLRA for Eastern Air Lines. Can It Fly? 44 U. MICH. L.
REV. 539 (1989)).
10 See infra note 248 and accompanying text.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the air carriers'
duty to bargain over lay-offs with their unions under the
RIA and to suggest solutions consistent with the statute's
purpose and structure. The first part of this article
presents relevant provisions of the RLA. The second part
discusses applicable case law that developed in the three
decades between the two major Supreme Court decisions
on the issue of bargaining over lay-offs under the RLA."I
Case law, however, has not provided coherent and clear
answers to the interpretational problems the RLA's provi-
sions create. Thus, the final portion of this article will
suggest some guidelines for cases likely to arise in the
future.
II. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT
Embodying an agreement reached on a national level
by railroad employers and their unions, the RIA was en-
acted in 1926 by an almost unanimous Congress.' 2 This
agreement resulted from the desire by both the carriers
and the unions to put an end to the labor strife that had
occurred in the early 1920's.13 In addition, both parties
were dissatisfied with the Labor Board, created in 1920,
which had the authority to both mediate and arbitrate the
railroads' labor disputes.' 4 The RLA embodied the belief
that both parties should try to reach a solution to their
disputes without resorting to economic warfare and with-
out the threat of binding arbitration. 5 The act was
1 See infra notes 80-96, 212-246 and accompanying text.
12 Railway Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended
at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1982)). For the history of railroad labor relations at the
beginning of this century and the steps taken to enact the RLA, see Rehmus,
Evolution of Legislation Affecting Collective Bargaining in the Railroad and Airlines Indus-
tries in NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD, THE RAILWAY LABOR AcT AT FIFT 1 (C.
Rehmus ed. 1976) [hereinafter RLA AT Flvry]; see also Wilner, The Railway Labor
Act. Why, What, and For How Much Longer, Part 1, 55 TRANSP. PRAc. J. 242 (1988).
is See RIA AT FirY, supra note 12.
14 Id.
15 Id.
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amended in 1936 to include the airlines.' 6 One of the
main concerns of Congress, as reflected in the stated pur-
poses of the RLA, was the maintenance of an undisturbed
transportation system. This aim was to be achieved
through the peaceful settlement of labor disputes. Thus,
the Act was intended to aid in settling "disputes concern-
ing rates of pay, rules, or working conditions' '1 7 as well as
"disputes growing out of grievances or out of the inter-
pretation or application of agreements concerning rates
of pay, rules or working conditions."' 18
Regardless of which type of dispute is involved, the
RLA imposes a duty "to exert every reasonable effort to
make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay,
rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes,
whether arising out of the application of agreements or
otherwise."' 9 A later amendment to the Act provided that
"[u]pon receipt of such certification [that a particular
union represents a group of employees] the carrier shall
treat the representative so certified as the representative
of the craft or class for the purpose of this Act."' 20 Both
parties, therefore, are required not only to bargain when
they disagree over a certain issue, but also to "exert every
reasonable effort" to reach an agreement. The United
States Supreme Court has held this obligation legally en-
forceable. 2' Generally, however, courts have abstained
from determining whether this duty was fulfilled. This ab-
stention is in deference to the judgment of the mediation
agency, the National Mediation Board (NMB), which can
16 See Comment, Airline Labor Policy, The Stepchild of the Railway Labor Act, 18 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 461 (1951).
,1 45 U.S.C. § 151(a)(4).
1" Id. § 151(a)(5).
1" Id. § 152(1) (This language is certainly stricter than the "good faith" bargain-
ing requirement of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 151 et. seq. (1982). This difference has
been, for the most part, unnoticed by courts and commentators.); see also id.
§ 152(2). "All disputes between carrier or carriers and its or their employees shall
be considered, and, if possible, with all expedition, in conference ... ." Id.
20 Id. § 152(9). This certification is issued by the National Mediation Board, a
three member agency, with the authority, inter alia, to conduct representation
elections. Id.
21 Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570 (1971).
prolong mediation efforts when it sees that one party is
bargaining inappropriately.2 2
Before examining the other provisions of the Act, a
look at the broad language used in defining the extent of
the duty to bargain (a duty called the heart of the RLA by
the Supreme Court)2 3 is worthwhile. For example, the
use of the phrase "all disputes" reflects broad coverage.24
Other indications also strengthen the impression that the
duty was to have a broad scope. The Congressional testi-
mony of the unions' counsel indicates that "it is made the
duty of the parties ... to settle all disputes, whether aris-
ing out of obligations of such agreements or otherwise in
order to avoid any interruption of interstate com-
merce." 25 Identical language is used in the Senate's Inter-
state Commerce Committee Report which states that one
of the objectives of the Act was "[t]hat any and all dis-
putes shall first be considered in conference between the
parties directly interested. 2 6
This far reaching language reflected nothing more than
the existing railroad industry practice of extensive collec-
tive bargaining. 27 In fact, as one observer noted, the ex-
tent to which collective bargaining was required was not a
controversial issue and was one Congress did not conclu-
sively address, 28 which is indicative of the broad scope of
the duty to bargain. The courts have generally continued
2 For a discussion of the role of the NMB, see infra notes 36-39 and accompa-
nying text.
22 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369,
377-78 (1969).
24 45 U.S.C. § 153.
2- Hearings on Railroad Labor Disputes (H.R. 7180) Before the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1926) [hereinafter Hear-
ings]. In evaluating the weight of this testimony, the Supreme Court noted that,
since the RLA was the enactment of an agreement between management and un-
ions, "the statements of the spokesmen for the two parties made in the hearings
on the proposed Act are entitled to great weight in the construction of the Act."
Chicago & N. W. Ry., 402 U.S. at 576.
26 S. REP. No. 222, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1926), quoted in Weber, Public Policy
and the Scope of Collective Bargaining, 13 LAB. L.J. 49, 56-57 (1962).
27 See Weber, supra note 26, at 52.
2a Id. at 56.
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this liberal approach toward the duty to bargain collec-
tively. Not until the acute financial problems and deep
change in the political climate of the 1970s and 1980s did
some courts take a different approach by finding certain
disputes non-bargainable, as discussed in detail below.
Although stating that both parties are under an obligation
to bargain in any kind of dispute arising between them,
the statute differentiates between the settlement proce-
dures that the parties are to follow when negotiations fail.
This differentiation is made in accordance with the nature
of the dispute involved. On the one hand are disputes
concerning "changes in rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions";2 9 on the other hand are those disputes
"growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or
application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules,
and working conditions. "30 At first glance, this distinction
might appear to correspond to the classical distinction be-
tween "disputes of interests" and "disputes of rights;" 3'
the courts, however, have categorized the disputes as
"major" and "minor. "32 As will become apparent
throughout this article, this distinction is not clear-cut.
Rather it is vague, wavering, and overlapping.
A. Major Disputes
For major disputes, the Act provides a very comprehen-
sive framework designed to postpone strikes until every
opportunity for reaching an agreement has been ex-
45 U.S.C. § 155(1)(a).
o Id. § 153(l)(i).
31 See Comment, supra note 16, at 468. The problem with this analogy is that
although it is correct as far as grievances are concerned, it fails to adequately
address the issue of interpretation. As discussed in section II, some courts give
such a broad reading to "interpretation of a contract" that they characterize as
arbitrable conflicts those disputes which are actually conflicts of interest, not
rights, and thus subject to bargaining, not arbitration. See also Note, Labor Law-
Railway Labor Act--Major and Minor Disputes, 31 J. AIR L. & COM. 371, 373 (1965).
"Generally when the courts have been forced to refer to the bargaining agree-
ment in order to reach their decisions, they have classified a controversy 'mi-
nor.'" Id.
32 See, e.g., Elgin, Joliet. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945).
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hausted. First, the Act imposes upon the parties a duty to
give a thirty-day advance notice of any intended changes
to existing collective agreements. 33 This thirty-day period
is the first of three such periods during which the parties
are not allowed to implement any change to existing
agreements or resort to self-help. 4
Within these thirty days, the two parties must engage in
the negotiations discussed above. 5 If unable to reach an
agreement, either party may invoke the services of the Na-
tional Mediation Board (NMB), authorized to mediate be-
tween disputing parties subject to the RLA.36 The NMB,
which may also intervene on its own initiative, will "use its
best efforts, by mediation, to bring ... [the parties] to
agreement. ' ' 37 The second stage during which neither
party may change the existing status quo is during the pe-
riod in which the NMB is trying to achieve a solution
through mediation.
The courts have ruled that the NMB has almost abso-
lute discretion to determine how long its mediation serv-
ices will be offered and whether an impasse has been
reached, rendering further mediation meaningless.3 "
Thus, the process of mediation, combined with the obli-
" 45 U.S.C. § 156. The Supreme Court has ruled that these changes may also
involve a past practice in the workplace that has been long followed by the em-
ployer and accepted by the employees. Thus, if an employer's decision is consis-
tent with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, but is contrary to the
established practice of the company, the employer must follow the "major dis-
pute" procedures established in the RLA. Detroit & Toledo Shore Line. R.R. v.
United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 143 (1969). For a discussion of the bargain-
able issues related to maintaining stable employment conditions, see infra notes
85-92 and accompanying text.
34 Jacksonville, 394 U.S. at 378. "While the dispute is working its way through
these [three] stages, neither party may unilaterally alter the status quo." Id.
35 For a discussion of bargaining requirements, see supra notes 19-22 and ac-
companying text.
- 45 U.S.C. § 154.
37 Id. § 155(1).
38 See Bad Faith Finding Held Necessary for Court Order Ending Mediation, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 219, at A-5 (Nov. 15, 1989) ("Absent a finding that the National
Mediation Board acted in 'patent official bad faith' . . . a federal court has no
authority to review the board's decision."); see also International Ass'n of Machin-
ists & Aerospace Workers v. NMB, 425 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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gation of both parties to maintain the status quo, may be-
come a strong tool in the hands of the NMB for delaying
the outbreak of a strike and the implementation of an em-
ployer's decision to alter the collective agreement or past
practice.39
Understanding the implications which a prolonged sta-
tus quo has upon labor relations is important. Although
this mechanism seems prima facie neutral, in fact it is not.
In periods of economic expansion, when the main focus
of bargaining is on the percentage of profits potentially
going into wage increases, the status quo and prolonged
mediation work in favor of the employer, substantially de-
laying wage increases and preventing strikes at a time
when a strike might be quite effective. By contrast, in re-
cession periods, when the focus of bargaining is on possi-
ble concessions the employer might gain from employees
in order to survive the crisis, the status quo operates in
favor of the unions because the employer cannot immedi-
ately implement his contemplated cut in wages. Neither
does the prohibition of strikes greatly disadvantage the
unions because in times of economic recession and losses
to the company, the strike weapon is of relatively limited
effectiveness. 40 This latter scenario was prevalent in the
airline industry in the 1980s, as bargaining at that time
generally involved wage concessions.4 ' The NMB's tactic
of prolonging negotiations certainly upset the manage-
ment of several airlines eager to unilaterally implement
wage cuts opposed by the unions.42
s1 It is estimated that the average length of mediation is seven to eight months.
See Burgoon, Mediation Under the Railway Labor Act, in RLA AT Fivry, supra note 12,
at 79.
40 When a company is in poor economic shape, the union that considers going
on strike confronts a very difficult problem: its members might not participate,
fearing that the firm will collapse. Even if the strike is successful in terms of mem-
bership support, the strike may lead the company to a financial disaster to the
detriment of both the union and its members. The recent strike at Eastern exem-
plifies this point. See Bradsher, supra note 2; cf Bellace, Employment Protection in the
EEC, 20 STAN. J. INT'L L. 413, 415-16 n.13 (1985).
41 Cassell & Spencer, supra note 5, at 4-5.
42 The latest and more publicized example is that of Eastern's negotiations with
the machinists' union, when the mediation lasted for more than a year.
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When the NMB declares that its mediation efforts have
failed, the Board will proffer arbitration.4 3 The parties,
however, have no obligation to accept this proposal.44 It
is curious that while arbitration law is designed to prevent
labor unrest, mutual agreement of the parties is required.
The RLA was the embodiment of a national collective
agreement in the rail industry, in which both parties were
concerned with preserving their autonomy against com-
pulsory government intervention.45 The parties were will-
ing to accept mediation and impose upon themselves
strict status quo requirements, as each feared the histori-
cally violent consequences of labor strife. They did not,
however, want the very terms of their agreement to be im-
posed by a governmental body.
If arbitration is not accepted by either party, as is usu-
ally the case in the airline industry,4 6 the Board notifies
the parties of its mediation failure and imposes a third
thirty day status quo period.4 7 During this period no
changes are allowed in the "rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions or established practices in effect prior to the
time the dispute arose."' 48 Only after this period expires
can economic warfare begin if an impasse still exists.
Practice shows that this thirty day period is crucial, be-
cause efforts to reach agreement are generally made until
the last moment of the deadline.49
4s 45 U.S.C. § 157(1).
44 See generally Jacksonville, 394 U.S. at 379 (Supreme Court discussion on unsuc-
cessful attempts by Congressional members to impose compulsory arbitration).
45 For the testimony of Donald R. Richberg, counsel for the unions, see Hear-
ings, supra note 25, at 15.
46 For a rare and recent exception, see T. W. U. Flight Attendants Move Toward New
Contracts with Pan Am World Airways, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 195, at A-9 (Oct. 7,
1988).
47 45 U.S.C. § 155(1).
48 Id.
49 If, however, the NMB finds that the dispute "threaten[s] substantially to in-
terrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the
country of essential transportation service" it is required to notify the President.
45 U.S.C. § 160. The President "may ...in his discretion, create a board to
investigate and report respecting such dispute." Id.
From the date such an emergency board is created until 30 days after it has
submitted its report to the President, the parties are precluded from making uni-
9471990] LA YOFFS
948 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [55
Only after these procedures have been exhausted may a
strike begin. Interestingly, the RLA does not explicitly
protect the right of employees to resort to strike, but no
doubt exists that this right is implied by the statute. For
example, the Supreme Court in Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co. 50 found an implicit pro-
tection of the right to strike:
Nowhere does the text of the Railway Labor Act specify
what is to take place once these procedures have been ex-
hausted without yielding resolution of the dispute. Im-
plicit in the statutory scheme, however, is the ultimate
right of the disputants to resort to self-help--"the inevita-
ble alternative in a statutory scheme which deliberately de-
nies the final power to compel arbitration.15 1
Obviously, this law severely restricts the right to strike,
at least as interpreted by the courts.52 The unions cannot
strike pending resolution of major disputes, which may
take several months. This was the price unions had to pay
in order to impose on management prolonged status quo
requirements during major disputes. 53 The RLA seems to
lateral changes "in the conditions out of which the dispute arose." Id. The report
of the emergency board is not binding upon the parties; its purpose is mainly to
inform the public, which in turn may exercise pressure upon the parties to reach
an agreement. This intention, however, of the Act's drafters has not been fulfilled
and the reports of the emergency board often have been ignored. See Cullen,
Emergency Boards Under the Railway Labor Act, in RLA AT Fivrv, supra note 12, at 158-
62.
No such board has been created in the airline industry since 1966. Presumably,
this is a reflection of the belief that given the multitude of carriers, a strike affect-
ing only an individual carrier does not create an emergency situation.
0 394 U.S. at 369.
51 Id. at 378 (quoting the court in Florida E. Coast Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen, 336 F.2d 172, 181 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 990 (1968)).
52 See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952) (rul-
ing that the RLA takes precedence over the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which seriously
limited the availability of injunctions against strikes).
" Under the RLA, however, the unions have the weapon of the sympathy strike,
something not available under the NLRA. See Burlington N. R.R. v. Brotherhood
of Maintenance, 481 U.S. 429 (1987) (wherein the Supreme Court affirmed this
right). The public's hostility against sympathy strikes (a hostility more than appar-
ent in Eastern's sympathy strikes) casts strong doubt on the actual availability of
this weapon for unions in the airline industry. Additionally, throughout the East-
ern Air Lines litigation, lower courts eagerly issued temporary injunctions against
Eastern's threatened sympathy strikes, consistent with public, rather than the
have reached a delicate balance by, on the one hand, re-
stricting the right to strike and, on the other hand, limit-
ing the employer's ability to implement its decisions.
Whatever one might say about the wisdom of such restric-
tions, the courts, in their interpretation of the law, should
not destroy this delicately balanced scheme by giving
preference to management's need for speedy implemen-
tation of its decisions, thereby destroying the status quo
obligations. The Act does not favor the needs of manage-
ment; it restricts both parties' freedom of action. This
mutuality of obligation should be respected by the courts;
unfortunately, however, this is not always the case.
B. Minor Disputes
Legislative history indicates that minor disputes were
considered to be of lesser importance because they pres-
ent a smaller threat to industrial peace. 54 The Act, there-
fore, provides for different procedures in this context.
The RLA established the National Adjustment Board
for the purpose of settling minor disputes.55 Alterna-
tively, however, the parties could create their own "sys-
tem, group, or regional boards of adjustment" for minor
dispute settlement. 6 The alternative has been the choice
of the airline industry. For example, although the 1936
RLA amendments provided for the creation of a National
Air Transportation Adjustment Board when deemed nec-
essary by the NMB,57 this has never been done; settlement
Supreme Court's, opinion. See, e.g., ALPA v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 703 F. Supp.
962 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 863 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
54 See Hearings, supra note 25, at 12-13. "The minor disputes are technical dis-
putes," as opposed to major disputes which concern "fundamental economic dif-
ferences . . .and where serious differences are likely to develop." Id.
5 45 U.S.C. § 153(1). The Board consists of "thirty-four members, seventeen
of whom shall be selected by the carriers and seventeen by such labor organiza-
tions of the employees, national in scope, as have been or may be organized in
accordance with the provisions of sections 151a and 152 of this title." Id.
§ 152(1)(a).
56 45 U.S.C. § 153(2).
57 Id. § 183. "The parties or either party to a dispute between an employee or a
group of employees and a carrier or carriers by air may invoke the services of the
National Mediation Board ...... Id.
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has been left to adjustment boards created by collective
agreements at the individual carrier level.
The RLA does not provide the same extensive status
quo requirements for minor disputes as it does for major
disputes. Minor disputes arise when one party misinter-
prets provisions of the agreement. Thus, since the issue
turns on contract interpretation, each party believes it is
complying with the terms of the agreement and neither is
aware of any violations. A status quo requirement is only
useful if a violation can be detected and therefore
enjoined.
Another reason for the lack of status quo obligations in
this context is that the drafters of the Act did not consider
minor disputes serious enough to give rise to strikes and,
therefore, found it unnecessary to provide for "cooling
off" periods.
The courts, however, have ruled that, while strikes over
minor disputes are prohibited 5 8 management is not pre-
vented from implementing a decision that gives rise to a
minor dispute.5 9 Thus, the courts have created an imbal-
ance that was probably not intended by the drafters of the
Act. To resolve this inequity, the Supreme Court has
ruled that courts have discretion to issue a status quo in-
junction against the employer when the threat of irrepara-
ble harm to employees exists.6 ° Courts, however, have
generally been reluctant to do so. 6 1
III. THE CASE LAW
An examination of recent case law development con-
-' See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30,
34-36, reh'g denied, 353 U.S. 948 (1957) (discussing minor disputes).
59 See, e.g., Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 845 F.2d
1187 (3d Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 2477 (1989) (court had no
jurisdiction under the RLA to handle a minor dispute involving the railroad's uni-
lateral implementation of drug testing).
- Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 363
U.S. 528 (1960).
6 For a discussion of courts' reluctance to issue preliminary injunctions in mi-
nor disputes, see infra text accompanying notes 125-127.
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cerning the duty to bargain over lay-offs under the RLA is
even more important than analyzing the specific provi-
sions of the statute. The vagueness of the statutory term
"working conditions" and the fact that the RLA is over
sixty-five years old has left the courts a wide margin for
interpretative "ventures" when construing the law. Not
by chance have the most recent decisions almost ignored
the language and legislative history of the statute and, in-
stead, depended entirely on case law.
There are two basic questions which the courts must
address when adjudicating a dispute involving the duty to
bargain over lay-off decisions. First, the court must de-
cide whether the managerial decision which caused the
dispute is covered, as a matter of law, by the concept of
managerial prerogative. If so, there is no duty to bargain
over the lay-off decision. This question is not answered
by reference to the particular contractual relationship be-
tween the parties but rather, depends on the particular la-
bor statute involved and the case law interpreting it.
If a certain managerial decision is not covered by mana-
gerial prerogative as a matter of law, the court must ad-
dress the possibility that, under the particular collective
agreement and/or established practice at the moment the
dispute arose, the employer had the right to implement
his decision without any bargaining with the union. This
issue involves an interpretation of the contractual rela-
tionship between the parties and falls under the jurisdic-
tion of the arbitration boards. However straightforward
this might seem in theory, it is much more complicated in
practice. If an employer is allowed to characterize a dis-
pute surrounding a management decision as one involv-
ing interpretation of the contract, he will be able to
eliminate collective bargaining from a whole range of is-
sues. This development is unwarranted by the RLA and,
as discussed below, goes deep into the heart of the prob-
lem of distinguishing major and minor disputes.
Crucial to the understanding of case law development
in this area is a recognition of the significant conse-
1990] LA,, YOFFS 951
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quences of characterizing a dispute as major or minor. If
the dispute is major, the employer cannot implement his
decision until the lengthy procedures of bargaining and
mediation required under the RLA are exhausted.62 By
contrast, if the dispute is minor, the employer is free to
proceed with his plans and the union has no right to
strike.63
The employer's obligation to refrain from proceeding
with his plans while he bargains with the union is not
unique to the RLA. Indeed, it is well settled that under
the NLRA employers cannot change existing working
conditions during negotiations with the union until an
impasse is reached.64 What is unique, however, is the
great amount of time bargaining may consume under the
auspices of the NMB.65 Equally important is the broad
definition given to employer status quo obligations in ma-
jor disputes under the RLA.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of status quo
obligations in Detroit & Toledo Shore Line Railroad Co. v.
United Transportation Union.66 Although not addressing a
lay-off situation, the case is very important because of its
status quo definition. In Toledo, a railroad's decision to
change "outlying work assignments" threatened to incon-
venience employees. 7 The union protested the railroad's
decision by invoking the "major dispute" settlement pro-
62 45 U.S.C. § 155(l)(a) (1982).
63 For a discussion of the employee's options in minor disputes, see supra notes
54-57 and accompanying text.
- 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(4) (1982). See also NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962)
(Court held that employer violated the duty to bargain collectively under the
NLRA by unilaterally implementing wage changes and sick-leave benefits, as well
as other merit awards).
61 See Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 384 U.S. 238
(1966). The court noted that "the procedures of the Act are purposely long and
drawn out, based on the hope that reason and practical considerations will pro-
vide in time an agreement that resolves the dispute." Id. at 246, see also Detroit &
Toledo Shore Line R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 149 (1969) (Me-
diation under RLA may become "an almost interminable process").
- 396 U.S. at 142.
67 Id. at 143-44. The new assignments would result in some employees report-
ing to work 35 miles from their eventual destination. Id. at 144.
cedures of the RLA. After the parties failed to reach an
agreement on their own, the case was referred to the
NMB, where it was determined that the employer was not
prohibited from making such assignments. The union re-
sponded with a request for bargaining, attempting to
change the collective agreement in such a way that the
employer would be prohibited from making such assign-
ments. With the assistance of the NMB, bargaining com-
menced. While bargaining was in process, however, the
employer unilaterally implemented the disputed work as-
signments. 6 The dispute was then taken to federal dis-
trict court where the railroad was enjoined from
establishing new work assignments while bargaining was
pending.6 9
In an appeal before the Supreme Court, seven justices
ruled that, as a matter of law, an employer was not al-
lowed to make unilateral changes before the bargaining
process was exhausted. Justice Black, writing for the ma-
jority, defined the status quo obligations of the employer
as a duty "to preserve and maintain unchanged those ac-
tual, objective working conditions and practices, broadly
conceived, which were in effect prior to the time the pend-
ing dispute arose and which are involved in or related to
that dispute."7 In his reasoning, Justice Black empha-
sized the Act's purpose of preventing strikes, 71 and found
that its status quo provisions "are central to its design. 72
He explained that the status quo's immediate effect is to
prevent strikes and provide time for peaceful and produc-
tive resolutions to labor disputes.73 Justice Black further
added that the Act is useful in forcing a compromise be-
- Id. at 145. The railroad determined that work crews could be taken from site
to site by cab. Id.
69 Id. at 146-47.
70 Id. at 153.
7' Id. at 148. Strikes were considered a wasteful interruption of interstate com-
merce. Id.
72 Id. at 150. The court concluded that the immediate effect of the Act was to
prevent strikes and actions leading to strikes. Id.
73 Id. In the long run, delaying the time when the parties can resort to self-help
provides time for tempers to cool, helps create an atmosphere in which rational
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tween two feuding parties.74
According to the Supreme Court, by implementing the
very decision that was the focus of negotiations, the em-
ployer defeated the primary goal of the Act.75 Thus, the
Court concluded that the employer would be able to make
changes only if such changes had occurred for a length of
time such that they had become part of accepted working
conditions, which was not the case in the Toledo dispute.76
The importance of the Toledo case is difficult to exagger-
ate. It established the rule that even if the employer is not
prevented by a particular agreement to make and imple-
ment a certain decision, he is prohibited from doing so
once bargaining arises concerning the disputed deci-
sion.77 Only if, when bargaining begins, it has already be-
come an established practice for the employer to make
such decisions without any union reaction, 78 may the em-
ployer freely proceed with his decision.
bargaining can occur, and permits public sentiment to be mobilized in favor of a
settlement without a strike or lockout.
74 Id. "[TIhe power which the Act gives the other party to preserve the status
quo for a prolonged period will frequently make it worthwhile for the moving
party to compromise with the interests of the other side and thus reach agreement
without interruption to commerce." Id.
75 Id. at 154. The Court also felt that the resort to self help by one party would
make the other party feel justified in similar actions. These events would frustrate
the purposes of the Act even more. Id. As Justice Black explained,
When the union moves to bring such a previously uncovered condi-
tion within the agreement, it is absolutely essential that the status
quo provisions of the Act apply to that working condition if the pur-
pose of the Act is to be fulfilled. If the railroad is free at this stage to
take advantage of the agreement's silence and resort to self-help, the
union cannot be expected to hold back its own economic weapons,
including the strike. Only if both sides are equally restrained can the
Act's remedies work effectively.
Id. at 155.
76 Id. at 154. The Court concluded that unilateral changes by an employer were
only possible if those changes "had occurred for a sufficient period of time with
the knowledge and acquiescence of the employees to become in reality a part of
the actual working conditions." Id.
11 In Toledo there was an arbitration award which said the agreement did not bar
unilateral employer action. Id. at 146; see supra note 64 and accompanying text for
a discussion on employer limitations on bargaining.
- But see Justice Harlan's dissent discussing the unlikelihood that the Act was
meant to require two parties to remain at the same historical point merely because
one does not wish to change. Toledo, 396 U.S. at 159-61 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The implications of this decision are obvious. If the
employer contemplates decisions which lead to lay-offs
and the dispute created is characterized as major, Toledo
dictates that he cannot implement his decision until the
bargaining process is exhausted, unless the implementa-
tion of such unilateral decisions is a well established and
accepted practice. Hence, one may easily understand the
eagerness of employers to have courts characterize a dis-
pute over a lay-off decision as minor.
A last point needs to be made before discussing litiga-
tion. The distinction between major and minor disputes
is not coextensive with the distinction between mandatory
and permissive subjects of bargaining found in NLRA
case law. The latter distinction refers primarily to the is-
sue of management prerogative and is determined by law.
By contrast, the distinction between major and minor dis-
putes takes for granted that a certain issue is, as a matter
of law, a mandatory subject of bargaining. The question
remaining is whether the issue is bargainable in the con-
text of a particular contractual relationship.
Until recently, courts failed to address the issue of man-
agement prerogative under the RLA, focusing primarily
on whether a dispute is major or minor. To the extent
this approach implied the issue was, as a matter of law,
amenable to bargaining, the' airline unions were in a bet-
ter position than their counterparts in industries covered
by NLRA. Even if a dispute was found to be minor, noth-
ing prevented the union from requesting bargaining over
the issue once the collective bargaining period expired,
since the issue was not precluded, by law, from bargain-
ing. Only recently have courts, including the Supreme
Court,79 found management prerogative to preclude bar-
gaining as a matter of law. The remainder of this section
will discuss judicial treatment of these two separate issues
79 See Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct.
2584 (1989) (finding no duty to bargain over management's decision to sell its
assets). For a discussion of the case, see infra notes 212-261 and accompanying
text.
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and will draw some conclusions as to where the law re-
garding lay-off bargaining stands today.
A. Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago
& North Western Railway.
The first Supreme Court cases dealing with other labor
law controversies in the United States arose in the railway
industry. The controversy concerning the duty to bargain
over managerial decisions which reduce a company's la-
bor force is no exception. In Order of Railroad Telegraphers
v. Chicago & North Western Railway. ,80 a railroad sought an
injunction against a strike which was being organized by a
union. The union, claiming that the company's plan to
change the organization of its operations was outdated
and economically wasteful, sought to amend the collective
bargaining agreement with the proposal that "[no job]
position in existence on December 3, 1957, will be abol-
ished or discontinued except by agreement between the
carrier and the organization.""' When management re-
fused to discuss the proposed amendment, the union
called for a strike. The company eventually sought a
court injunction against the strike, claiming the union's
proposal was not a bargainable issue.82
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court held that
the strike was not enjoinable under the Norris-La Guardia
Act because it supported a bargainable issue. 3 Justice
Black, writing for the majority, said that the legislative his-
tory and the language of the RLA made it clear that courts
should avoid intervening in labor disputes, as Congress,
for this purpose, defined very broadly the issues subject to
bargaining.8 4 In determining whether the dispute was
covered by the Act's definition of bargainable issues, Jus-
tice Black focused not on the nature of the managerial de-
8o 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
81 Id. at 332.
82 Id.
8- Id. at 340. Also, nothing the union requested would require the railroad to
violate any law or the order of any public agency. Id.
84 Id. at 335-36.
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cision but rather on the union's demand. He said that the
proposed amendment restricting management's power to
implement lay-offs "plainly" referred to the "conditions
of employment" of the railway employees and was there-
fore bargainable under the RLA.8 5
More importantly, Justice Black explicitly rejected the
lower court's finding that the amendment was an attempt
to "usurp legitimate managerial prerogative" concerning
the efficiencies of its operations.8 6 Reviewing the RLA
and the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA),s7 the majority
found that the trend of legislation affecting employees
had been to broaden the scope of mandatory bargaining
subjects, and in any event, it was too late to begin saying
that employees have no influence on matters affecting not
only themselves, but also their employers and the public
at large.88 Emphasizing that the goal of both the RLA and
ICA is not only a well functioning transportation system,
but also fair and stable conditions of employment,8 9 the
Court found that the union's efforts to negotiate with the
railroad were designed to achieve these aims. 90 The
Court stressed that "[t]here is no express provision of
law, and certainly we can infer none from the Interstate
Commerce Act, making it unlawful for unions to want to
discuss with railroads actions that may vitally and ad-
versely affect the security, seniority and stability of rail-
road jobs."9 1
The majority, rejecting the railroad's contention that
the dispute was minor, noted that the proposal at issue
8- Id. at 336; see 45 U.S.C. § 152(1) (1982).
86 Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Order of R.R. Telegraphers, 264 F.2d 254, 259 (7th
Cir. 1959), rev'd, 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
87 49 U.S.C. § 5(2)(f) (1982).
88 Telegraphers, 362 U.S. at 338.
89 Id. at 337.
-0 Id. at 339. The union's actions were "far from violating the Railway Labor
Act" and rather complied with the "Act's command that employees as well as
railroads exert every reasonable effort to settle all disputes 'concerning rates of
pay, rules, and working conditions.'" Id.
91 Id. at 340. The union merely attempted to negotiate a contractual right.
"Nothing the union requested would require the railroad to violate any valid law
or the valid order of any public agency." Id.
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concerned major changes affecting jobs covered by an ex-
isting collective bargaining agreement and did not merely
involve the interpretation of that agreement.92 Justice
Black made it clear that the distinction between major and
minor disputes is directly related to the actual importance
of the dispute; therefore, any dispute that has a significant
impact on the employees' working environment can be
classified as a major dispute.
The railroad's final argument was that the injunction
should be granted to shut down inefficient stations, serv-
ices and lines because such waste was contrary to the Con-
gressional policy of fostering an efficient national
transportation system.93 The Court, in rejecting this ar-
gument, pointed out that Congress, by enacting legisla-
tion such as the Railway Labor and Norris-LaGuardia
Acts, chose to promote collective bargaining with the
knowledge that such a process could increase operating
expenses.94
The minority focused on the fact that the railroad had
agreed to negotiate with the union regarding the effects of
its decisions, particularly station abandonments, on em-
ployees.95 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Whittaker
noted that the proposed clause would require the em-
ployer to obtain the union's consent before laying off any
employees and found that such a clause violates Congres-
sional policy against allowing unions veto power over
transactions favored by ICA.96
The importance of this decision is apparent. It is the
only Supreme Court decision addressing both the major/
1' Id. at 341.
"' Id. at 342.
" Id. The Court stated that not all employee expenses constitute waste, and if
the focus of these two acts is to reduce waste, Congress, not the courts, should
enunciate the policy. Id.
9. Id. at 357. The company agreed to discuss the following measures: (1) trans-
ferring affected employees to other jobs; (2) limiting the number of lay-offs to a
certain number per year; and (3) paying supplemental unemployment benefits to
the furloughed employees. Id. (Whittaker, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 354-55. This is a distinct and separate issue which is beyond the scope
of this article since it does not affect the airline industry.
minor distinction dispute and management prerogative is-
sues.97 In both, the Supreme Court chose to protect the
interests of the employees and require bargaining. The
Court used a simple analysis to classify the managerial de-
cisions involved,98 and refused to discuss how labor costs
affected the employer's decisions, or how close the deci-
sion was to the so-called core of managerial prerogative.
Neither did the Court invoke the legalistic standards em-
ployed later by several courts in their efforts to distinguish
between major and minor disputes. 99 The Court viewed
the union's legitimate interest in protecting its members'
jobs as sufficient justification to require bargaining under
the RLA. °00 Relying on the reality of bargaining expan-
sion, the Court stressed that the judiciary should refrain
from intervening in the parties' relationship under the
RLA. In acknowledging the trend of bargaining expan-
sion, the Court indicated that the proper subjects of nego-
tiation should not be determined by the courts but rather
by the parties themselves and their respective bargaining
positions at any given time. Finally, it is important to note
that the Court remained unimpressed by the difficult eco-
nomic conditions facing the company,10' noting that the
problems caused by bargaining are a concern for Con-
gress and not for the Court.10 2
In the years following the 1960 Telegraphers decision, the
97 Later cases dealt only with the management prerogative issue. For a discus-
sion of one such case, Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, see infra notes 212-261 and accompa-
nying text.
98 For an example of the complex analysis utilized in subsequent Supreme
Court decisions, see First Nat'l Maintenance v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981)..
See infra notes 122-144.
,oo Telegraphers, 362 U.S. at 336 ("We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals
that the union's effort to negotiate about the job security of its members 'repre-
sents an attempt to usurp legitimate managerial prerogative in the exercise of
business judgment with respect to the most economical and efficient conduct of its
operations.' ").
lo, Id. at 346-47. North Western lost $8,000,000 in the first quarter of 1956. As
a result, the company streamlined its operations resulting in several "one-man"
stations monitoring seldom-used routes. After studies revealed that most of these
agents were receiving a full day's pay for 15-30 minutes of work, North Western
moved to discontinue the "one-man" stations. Id.
102 Id. at 345.
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world's economic, social and political climate changed.
From 1970 through the early 1980s almost all nations, es-
pecially the United States, experienced a series of severe
economic crises characterized by the increasing and per-
sistent problem of unemployment. Labor relations were
severely strained as employers' and employees' concerns
increasingly diverged. On the one hand, companies were
looking for more flexible working conditions and, where
necessary, the freedom to reduce labor forces in order to
adjust to external economic and technological strains. On
the other hand, employees and their unions shifted their
focus from wage increases to job security issues.' 0 3 These
conflicting goals led to turbulent labor relations, espe-
cially in labor intensive industries such as the airline
industry. 04
Unlike the situation in other Western countries, 10 5 the
dominant labor relations policy of the Reagan Adminis-
tration was that of government abstention, a policy which,
in an era of union weakness, actually favored the employ-
ers. Union weakness was clearly seen, not only by their
rapid decline in membership, but also by their declining
public approval, which bottomed out in the early
eighties. 0 6
Not surprisingly, the jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court also changed. This change first occurred in NLRA
cases. In a 1965 case, Textile Workers Union v. Darlington
Manufacturing Co.,107 the Supreme Court unanimously
ruled that an employer does not violate his obligations
under the NLRA if he closes his entire business, even if he
1os See Waning Union Influence Cited as Factor Contributing to Wage Gain Moderation,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 150, at A-6 (Aug. 4, 1988).
-o See supra note 5 and accompanying text for discussion of the airline industry
structure.
105 See generally Papaioannou, The Duty to Bargain Over Lay-Offs in Other Western
Countries: A View From an American Perspective, 7 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1990).
-0 See M. GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE U.S. 35-36
(1987). The public approval of unions during the mid-1980s was the lowest since
World War I. Id.
-- 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
acted with an anti-union animus.° 8 The Court in Darling-
ton held that, with respect to the National Labor Relations
Act, an employer has the absolute right to terminate his
business for any reason he sees fit.'° 9 The Court refused
to adhere to the proposition that a businessman may not
conduct his business operations as he desires, absent an
unequivocal legislative intent or judicial precedent." 0
The Court adopted the view of the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals that, just as the Labor Relations Act cannot
bind a person to employment, it cannot force a person to
remain an employer. So long as the obligations of all em-
ployment contracts have been met, freedom of choice
prevails."' Although the decision did not involve the
duty to bargain but concerned only the anti-union animus
of the employer, the court's reasoning is very important
because it was used by the Supreme Court in 1989 to limit
the duty to bargain under the RLA . 2
The next step in this progression was seen in a 1981
case, First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,' ' 3 in which
the Court substantially reduced the scope of the duty to
bargain over lay-offs. The case involved a partial closure
of the employer's business. Justice Blackmun, writing for
the majority, held that this type of managerial decision is
not a mandatory subject of bargaining because the bal-
08 Id. at 273-74. Darlington involved the liquidation of a textile mill in response
to a successful union organization campaign. The NLRB deemed the closing ille-
gal because of the anti-union animus of Darlington's majority stockholder. Id. at
265-67. The fact that this rather conservative decision dates back to the liberal
1960s does not attenuate the impact of remarks just made regarding the facts that
led to the conservative change of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence seen in the
1970s and '80s. Rather, it indicates, apart from social circumstances, that the ju-
dicial majority never were ardent advocates of the union movement.
1- Id. at 268.
lo Id. at 270. With respect to the legislative intent, neither the Wagner Act nor
the Taft-Hartley Act addressed the proposition that an owner may be prevented
from terminating his business. The same conclusion holds true with respect to
judicial precedent since no decision has addressed the particular issue. Id. See 29
U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1982) and 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1982).
i Id. at 271.
112 For the application of this reasoning in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, see infra notes
231-232 and accompanying text.
-, 452 U.S. at 666.
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ance of interests weighs against bargaining."t 4
In his reasoning, Justice Blackmun referred to manage-
ment's need of speedy, secret, and flexible decision mak-
ing, and he emphasized that the running of a profitable
business depended, to an extent, on management's free-
dom from the constraints of the bargaining process.' 1 5
He added that if dialogue between the parties is likely to
produce any satisfactory solutions, management will seek
collective bargaining on its own initiative." 6 If the dia-
logue is imposed by law, he argued, the union will have an
unwarranted tool to delay the implementation of the deci-
sion, to the company's ultimate detriment."t 7 Finally, Jus-
tice Blackmun acknowledged that bargaining should take
place regarding the effects of management's decisions on
employees; he emphasized, however, that this bargaining
should "be conducted in a meaningful manner and at a
meaningful time.""'
An evaluation of the First National decision and its im-
pact on the case law of the 1980s concerning the duty to
bargain over lay-offs under the NLRA is beyond the scope
of this article."t 9 What must be noted here, however, is
that the difference in approach between Telegraphers and
First National is apparent. The Court's focus shifted from
the employees' interests to the nature of management's
14 Id. at 679. The holding as well as the reasoning are clearly inconsistent with
Telegraphers. Realizing this, Justice Blackmun distinguished Telegraphers by saying
in a footnote that "the mandatory scope of bargaining under the Railway Labor
Act and the extent of the prohibition against injunctive relief contained in [the]
Norris-LaGuardia Act are not coextensive with the National Labor Relations Act
and the [NLRB's] jurisdiction over unfair labor practices." Id. at 686 n.23.
1 Id. at 678-79.
1,6 Id. at 682. "If labor costs are an important factor in a failing operation and
the decision to close, management will have an incentive to confer voluntarily with
the union to seek concessions that may make continuing the business profitable."
Id.
"17 Id. at 683. Mandatory bargaining "could afford a union a powerful tool for
achieving delay, a power that might be used to thwart management's intentions in
a manner nonrelated to any feasible solution the union might propose." Id.
Is Id. at 682; see Kohler, Distinctions Without Dtfferences: Effects Bargaining In Light
of First National Maintenance, 5 IND. REL. L.J. 402 (1983) (criticizing the vague dis-
tinctions between effects and decision bargaining).
Il For sources discussing the duty to bargain over lay-offs, see supra note 8.
decision. While Telegraphers opened the window for more
active involvement by employees in the affairs of their
company, First National signaled a return to the common-
law era when management decisions were final and em-
ployees' only choice was to acquiesce or leave the com-
pany. In dicta characteristic of the majority's philosophy,
Justice Blackmun said that "Congress had no expectation
that the elected union representative would become an
equal partner in the running of the business enterprise in
which the union's members are employed."' 120 As seen in
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad v. Railway Labor Executives'
Association,12 the Supreme Court eventually imported this
philosophy into labor disputes governed by the RLA.
Before examining this eventuality, however, the varied ap-
proaches of the lower courts in the period between Teleg-
raphers and Pittsburgh & Lake Erie will be discussed.
B. The Duty to Bargain Under the RLA in the Lower Courts:
The Road from Telegraphers to Pittsburgh & Lake Erie
1. Major/Minor Disputes
Having seen the initial stance of the Supreme Court on
the issue of the duty to bargain over lay-offs under the
RIA, a closer look at the early case law on the subject is
appropriate. Until the 1980s, there were few cases that ex-
plicitly addressed the limits of the duty to bargain over
managerial decisions reducing company jobs. The prob-
lem under the RLA turned on the distinction between ma-
jor and minor disputes.
As explained at the beginning of this article, 22 the RLA
distinguishes between two types of disputes, later charac-
terized by the Supreme Court as "major" and "minor"
disputes.12 3 Toledo established that the RIA imposes sta-
120 First National, 452 U.S. at 676.
121 109 S. Ct. 2584 (1989).
122 For a discussion of the distinction between major and minor disputes, see
supra notes 29-61 and accompanying text.
12s Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945). For extensive
excerpts from this decision, see infra notes 276-279 and accompanying text.
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tus quo requirements upon employers while settlement
procedures are in process. 2 4 To elaborate, courts have
consistently held that in major disputes, employers will be
enjoined from altering the status quo, and moreover, in
cases involving preliminary injunctions, unions need not
show irreparable harm. 125 It is, however, left to the dis-
cretion of the court whether or not to issue a status quo
injunction, and an injunction will be issue only after the
equities of the case have been considered. 26 Factors con-
sidered in determining issuance include the following: ir-
reparable harm to the petitioning party, probability of
success on the merits of the case, possible harmful effects
to each party in both the event and failure of issuance,
and finally, public interest. 27
Because the stakes are high, lower courts have generally
been divided in their approach to the critical issue of dis-
tinguishing the two types of disputes. Apparently, how-
ever, most courts prefer to chararactize a dispute as minor
when the employer decision at issue has a significant im-
pact on employees.
124 Toledo, supra note 77 and accompanying text.
12-1 See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 337 F.2d 127,
133-34 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
[W]e think that a showing of irreparable injury is not required
before the instant status quo injunction may issue, particularly be-
cause the question before us is concerned with far more than the
private rights and duties of the parties.... [T]he public interest in
peaceful settlement of labor disputes through utilization of statutory
procedures is also involved, and irreparable injury... is not an ele-
ment which bears significantly or relevantly on furthering the public
interest.
Id.; see also Brotherhood of Maintenance v. Burlington N. R.R., 802 F.2d 1016,
1021 (8th Cir. 1986), aff'd 481 U.S. 429 (1987); ALPA v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,
703 F. Supp. 962, 981 (D.D.C. 1988).
126 See, e.g., ALPA v. Northwest Airlines, 570 F.2d 257 (8th Cir. 1978); Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. Braniff Int'l Airways, 437 F.2d 1272, 1274 (5th Cir.
1971); see also Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R.,
363 U.S. 528, 534 (1960) (wherein the Supreme Court established that an injunc-
tion may be issued in a minor case if the equities so require).
127 See, e.g., Local 553, Transp. Workers Union v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 695
F.2d 668, 678 (2d Cir. 1982); Association of Flight Attendants v. Republic Air-
lines, 534 F. Supp. 783, 789 (D. Minn. 1982) (citing Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C.
L. Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981)).
At one end of the spectrum, courts rule that a dispute is
minor when an employer maintains that his decision is
justified by existing agreements and practice, unless the
employer's interpretation of the contract was "frivolous"
or "obviously insubstantial."'12  That is, a dispute is mi-
nor unless the "contractual justification [for the em-
ployer's action] is 'frivolous' or 'obviously
insubstantial,' 1,29 a standard which is admittedly light.13 0
Thus, the courts rule that the issue is a problem of differ-
ing contract interpretations, and therefore falls under the
arbitrational jurisdiction of the relevant adjustment
board. In such cases, the courts typically refuse to pre-
serve the status quo. The underlying rationale was best
expressed in Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v.
Railway Labor Executives Association 1s: "The primary factor
underlying this predisposition, in close cases, in favor of a
'minor dispute' finding is the concern for minimizing the
occurrence of strikes in the rail transportation indus-
try.... Rail unions are not permitted to strike over minor
disputes."' 32
Obviously however, the underlying philosophy of deci-
sions in favor of minor disputes goes far deeper. It re-
flects the same jurisprudence that, under the NLRA,
protects management prerogative against collective bar-
gaining. Since the lower courts, in the partial closure
cases, were prevented under Telegraphers from ruling that
'a See, e.g., Local 553, 695 F.2d at 673-75. But see Local Lodge 2144, Bhd. of Ry.
Clerks v. Railway Express Agency, 409 F.2d 312, 316 (2d Cir. 1969)).
129 National Ry. Labor Conference v. IAM, 830 F.2d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 1987)
(quoting Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 734 F.2d 317,
321 (7th Cir. 1984)). The employer's justification may also lie in the past practice
of the company. See, e.g. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Southwest Airlines,
842 F.2d 794, 804 (5th Cir. 1988). "In determining whether a proposal is 'argua-
bly justified' by the contract we must look both to the contract itself and to the
practices under the contract." Id.
so Brotherhood of Maintenance, 802 F.2d at 1022.
855 F.2d 1277, 1283 (7th Cir. 1988).
132 Id.; see also Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 833 F.2d
700, 705 (7th Cir. 1987). "Because a major dispute can escalate into a strike, if
there is any doubt as to whether a dispute is major or minor a court will construe
the dispute to be minor." Id.
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management prerogative precludes bargaining, they con-
fined themselves to the major-minor distinction and se-
lected the solution that best emulates the management
prerogative approach. Unfortunately, however, these
courts failed to see that their approach to the distinction
was inconsistent with the Telegraphers approach, which
turned on the importance of the dispute, rather than a test
favoring minor disputes.
These cases are significant because they ignore the im-
portance of the dispute, that is, whether the dispute is lit-
erally "major" or "minor" is never addressed. For
example, the Fifth Circuit, in International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Southwest Airlines,' 33 noted that the method for
determining whether a 'dispute is major or minor has ab-
solutely nothing to do with how important a dispute is.' 3 4
At the other end of the spectrum lie the cases that ex-
amine the substance of the dispute and find that a major
dispute exists when major changes in the work force re-
sult from the employer's decision. The fact that this ap-
proach is in the minority is surprising, as the leading case
among them is the Supreme Court's Telegraphers decision,
where the Court explicitly refused to characterize as mi-
nor a dispute involving the loss of numerous jobs. 35
Another leading case adopting the minority approach is
United Industrial Workers v. Board of Trustees of Galveston
Wharves,'3 6 decided by the Fifth Circuit in 1965. In that
case, involving a total closure, the court, despite the exist-
ence of a management prerogative clause in the contract,
emphasized the impact of the decision on the employees'
jobs:
[t]he very snarl these employees are in ... shows why an
employer subject to the Railway Labor Act may have spe-
cial obligations in pretermination bargaining. Suddenly
from an action which is entirely legitimate and undoubt-
" 842 F.2d at 794.
134 Id. at 803.
" See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
,36 351 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1965).
edly sound from an economic standpoint, employees of
long standing find themselves with neither job nor repre-
sentation continuity.1
3 7
More significantly, the Court said:
When we look at the sharp outlines of this case through
ordinary glasses, not major or minor lenses, we can see
this case for what it really is: during the term of the con-
tract, the Carrier terminated the contract by going out of
business. But it had no right to terminate the contract
prior to its expiration . . . . Without trespassing on the
exclusive domain of the Adjustment Board ... it is plain
that this action was not, and cannot even remotely bejusti-
fied as a 'lay off' . . . nor as the exercise of managerial
prerogative .... 38 Broad as is the management preroga-
tive clause there is absolutely nothing about the agree-
ment, or more fundamentally, about the nature of the
relationship and the peculiar role of collective bargaining
agreements in assuring industrial peace, which contem-
plates that during the term the employer has the right to
bring it all to an end simply by ceasing operations. 1 9
Whatever the validity of Galveston Wharves after Darling-
ton and Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, it is important for its ap-
proach to the major-minor distinction dispute. The Court
refused to make the major/minor distinction on the basis
of "artfully contrived formalistic demands or re-
sponses,"' 14 0 and, in support of this approach, quoted the
Telegraphers analysis of minor disputes.
1 4
'
Recently, the Second Circuit adopted the minority ap-
proach in Local 553, Transportation Workers Union v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc. ,142 arguing that the difficulties that arise in
construing a bargaining agreement support a more prag-
matic approach for determining the characteristics of a
137 Id. at 191.
1-8 [The court here is rebutting the employer's argument that the dispute in-
volves interpretational problems of the contract's lay off and management prerog-
ative provisions and was therefore a minor dispute.]
139 Galveston Wharves, 351 F.2d at 189.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 191 (citing Telegraphers, 362 U.S. at 337-38).
142 695 F.2d at 668.
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dispute. 143
In summary, the minority approach was best described
by a court which actually disapproved it in National Rail-
way Labor Conference v. International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers:
Under [the minority] line of analysis, a dispute with a sub-
stantial impactwould suggest a major dispute while a neg-
ligible impact would point to a minor dispute. This theory
is based on the supposition that 'major' and 'minor' de-
scribe actual pragmatic differences in the scope of the im-
pact of the dispute on the practices of the parties. 44
Since Telegraphers, the Supreme Court has not ruled on
the distinction between major and minor disputes in the
context of managerial decisions involving labor force re-
ductions. However, in a case not directly on point, the
Court has given a strong indication of its intentions. In
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives Associa-
tion,' 45 the Court, by a clear majority, held that the deci-
sion of the employer to impose drug testing on employees
constituted a minor dispute. There was, thus, no duty to
bargain. 146 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,
stated that:
[T]he formal demarcation between major and minor dis-
putes does not turn on a case-by-case determination of the
importance of the issue presented or the likelihood that it
would prompt the exercise of economic self-help ...
Rather it ... [depends on] whether a claim has been made
that the terms of an existing agreement either establish or
refute the presence of a right to take the disputed action.
The distinguishing feature of such a case is that the dis-
pute may be conclusively resolved by interpreting the ex-
4. Id. at 673-75. Other courts have also taken similar approaches, see, e.g.,
ALPA v. Wien Air Alaska, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3388 (D. Alaska 1984).
144 830 F.2d at 747 n.5.
"4 109 S.Ct. 2477 (1989).
146 Id. at 2479. The Court said in particular that the previous practice of physi-
cal examinations of the employees could arguably be interpreted as giving the
right to drug testing; therefore, the dispute was over the interpretation of that
practice and was to be resolved by an arbitration board. Id.
[55
isting agreement.' 4 7
The opinion is a clear repudiation of the minority ap-
proach to the major/minor dispute. The scope of the
holding, however, is unclear, as Consolidated Rail is off
point. For a number of reasons, the applicability of such
repudiation to a lay-off dispute is questionable.
A decision involving the loss of numerous jobs has an
infinitely greater impact on labor relations than a drug
testing decision. Further, the two types of decisions are
not equally amenable to collective bargaining and arbitra-
tion. The drug testing issue can be analyzed by determin-
ing whether previous physical examinations involved the
same degree of intrusiveness and to what extent such test-
ing discourages employment. These types of issues are
frequently determined by legal bodies such as an arbitra-
tion board. It seems unwise, however, to analyze an issue
involving the abolishment of hundreds or thousands of
jobs in terms of legal interpretations of disputes arising
from conflicts of social and economic interests. In the ab-
sence of any clear and explicit agreement by the parties,
these determinations should be left to the process of col-
lective bargaining.
Consolidated Rail's holding may additionally be inapplica-
ble to lay-off disputes because applicability would require
overruling Telegraphers. The Supreme Court in Telegra-
phers, a case directly involving lay-off disputes, explicitly
rejected the idea that a dispute "relating to a major
change, affecting jobs, in an existing collective bargaining
agreement, rather than to mere infractions or interpreta-
tion of the provisions of that agreement" could be charac-
terized as minor.148 In Consolidated Rail, Justice Blackmun
failed to even mention Telegraphers; this suggests strongly
the irrelevancy of Consolidated Rail in the labor dispute are-
ana. The lower courts should still consider themselves
bound by Telegraphers. The Supreme Court does not over-
147 Id. at 2481.
148 Telegraphers, 362 U.S. at 341.
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turn landmark decisions, such as Telegrapher, without a
thorough discussion of its reasons for doing so.
Thus, the issue has yet to be authoritatively addressed
by the Supreme Court. Given the disagreements among
the lower courts, however, the issue will likely be ad-
dressed soon. At the end of this section, suggestions are
made as to the appropriate approach the Supreme Court
should adopt to be consistent with the structure and phi-
losophy of the RLA.
2. Management Prerogative
The lower court cases are routinely concerned with the
distinction between major and minor disputes in the con-
text of a specific collective agreement. None explicitly re-
fer to the concept of management prerogative, which, as
defined by labor law, is applicable regardless of the cir-
cumstances of a particular labor relationship. The contro-
versy in the NLRA involving the distinction between
mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining, as well
as between bargaining the effects or the decision itself,
was unknown in RLA cases.
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
v. Northeast Airlines was the first case ever to discuss man-
agement prerogative under the RLA. 14 9 There, the First
Circuit held that a dispute over a merger was minor and
refused to issue a status quo injunction to prevent the
merger. Chief Judge Aldrich, writing for the court, re-
jected the union's argument that there was a statutory
duty to bargain over mergers. He distinguished Fibreboard
Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB 150 on the basis that a decision
to merge has a less direct and immediate impact on jobs
than a decision to subcontract work.'" Additionally, "the
149 473 F.2d 549 (1st Cir. 1972).
15o 379 U.S. 203 (1964). In that case, which arose under NLRA, the Supreme
Court ruled that an employer has a duty to bargain over his decision to subcon-
tract work and, thus, lay-off employees. The concurring opinion ofJustice Stewart
was very influential, providing the framework upon which the First National deci-
sion was based. See supra text accompanying note 129.
,5, Northeast, 473 F.2d at 556.
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decision to merge is much nearer the core of en-
trepreneurial control."' 152 After extensively quoting Jus-
tice Stewart's concurrence in Fibreboard, Judge Aldrich
determined that requiring an employer to include the
union, in some cases possibly many unions, in discussions
concerning a possible sale of the business would infringe
greatly upon his control over his investment.15 3 Even
more interesting was his point that an employee's per-
spective renders him incapable of accurately judging the
financial complexities often involved in mergers. 154
The court also rejected the union's argument that, at a
minimum, employers should be required to bargain over
a transaction's effect on employees' jobs. The court
opined that, although bargaining over a transaction's ef-
fect should normally be required, a merger is a unique
case because a second employer is involved. Specifically,
Judge Aldrich stated that:
[S]ince the merger itself is not the proximate cause ofjob
displacement, which will occur only as a result of manage-
ment decisions subsequently made by the surviving com-
pany, any negotiations between the company being
absorbed.., and its union about what protection the em-
ployees should have against such displacement would be
recklessly speculative, unless that company has knowledge
of and control over the acquirer's plans.' 55
The court refused to order the acquired company to re-
negotiate its merger contract with the purchasing airline
in order to include a clause that would make the collective
bargaining agreement binding upon the successor com-
pany. 5 6 The court felt that to hold otherwise would rob
152 Id. at 557.
153 Id.
154 Id.
ws Id. at 558.
so Id. The collective bargaining agreement between I.A.M. and Northeast Air-
lines-the airline to be purchased-had a clause that made the contract binding
upon "the successors or the assigns of the Company." Id. The successorship
doctrine has not been analytically discussed under the RLA. See Note, Airline
Merger and the Impact of a Minority Union's Labor Contract: The Delta- Western Air Lines
Merger, 18 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 195 (1988); see also Papaioannou, Labor Protec-
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management of the freedom to make the decision in the
first place. 157
Finally, Judge Aldrich determined that employees are
adequately protected by Labor Protection Provisions
(LPPs) imposed by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
upon approval of the merger. 5 8 This point limits the va-
lidity of this case in the 1980s because LPPs are no longer
imposed. The protection of by LPPs, however, was of-
fered as justification for the refusal to impose a duty to
bargain over a decision's effects. The denial of the duty to
bargain over the decision itself was not based on LPPs.
Another case involving the concept of management
prerogative was Japan Air Lines v. International Association of
Machinists. ' 9 In that case, the union sought to negotiate a
clause that would stop the airline's practice of subcon-
tracting maintenance and ground service work to other
companies. The case is of limited importance since it did
not involve the loss of existing jobs, but was rather an at-
tempt by the union to expand its members' job opportu-
nities. 160 Interestingly, however, the court rejected the
union's suggestion that "labor and management must
meet and confer over any proposal, advanced by either
party, which is neither unlawful nor expressly contra-
vened by a provision of the RLA."'' Thus, the court ac-
cepted that management prerogative excluded some
issues from bargaining, stating that "[w]hatever incidental
benefits may nonetheless accrue to Union members from
tive Provisions and Collective Agreements in Mergers (as part of his unpublished doctoral
thesis on airline labor law, available at the University of Pennsylvania Law School
Library).
1-17 Northeast, 473 F.2d at 558.
,1- Id. at 559-60. LPPs are conditions that CAB imposed upon approval of a
merger between airlines, with the purpose of protecting the employees who would
be adversely affected by transaction; see ROSENFIELD, LABOR PROTECTIVE PROVI-
SIONS IN AIRLINE MERGERS (1981) (LPPs have not been imposed since the early
1980s); Northrup, Airline Labor Protective Provisions: An Economic Analysis, 53 J. AIR
L. & CoM. 401 (1987).
538 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1976).
I00 ld. at 48. The court also distinguished Telegraphers because that case in-
volved losses of already existingjobs. Id. at 52-53.
l, Id. at 51.
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implementation of the scope proposal are outweighed by
[the airline's] proper interest in retaining basic control
over the size and direction of its enterprise."'' 62
These two cases, however, were decided before the de-
regulation of the airline industry in 1978. The cases con-
cerning management prerogative decided after
deregulation are more interesting as it is arguable that
more deference will be given to management prerogative
as a response to the pressures of fierce competition
among the airlines. 63 In addition, following First Na-
tional, the airlines increasingly argued in the courts that
their decisions were neither major nor minor, but merely
made according to management prerogative.
The following sections analyze three recent cases that
have dealt with this issue. The views represented by those
cases are characteristic of the choices available to the
Supreme Court when it decided Pittsburgh & Lake Erie.
a. ALPA v. Transamerica Airlines
ALPA v. Transamerica Airlines 4 was the first case to ap-
ply First National in the RLA context. The air carrier in
that case suffered considerable losses in the 1980s as a
result of the fierce competition in the airline industry. Its
parent company, Transamerica Corporation (TAC), de-
cided to divest itself of the air carrier. After unsuccess-
fully attempting to sell the carrier, TAC decided to
liquidate its subsidiary, Transamerica Airlines (Trans-
america), by selling its assets. ALPA and the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) sought to enjoin Trans-
america from implementing the decision to shut down op-
erations before engaging in collective bargaining with the
unions, according to the RLA's provisions for the settle-
ment of major disputes. 165
1- Id. at 52.
ios For sources presenting such an argument, see supra note 9.
123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2682 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
-65 Id. The exact legal basis of the union's suit is unclear from the opinion. The
union appeared to claim violations of the duty to bargain and the status quo re-
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The court denied a preliminary injunction because it
found that the decision to go completely out of business is
one so basic to business ownership that an employer has
no obligation to bargain with the union over the
decision. 166
The court further determined that neither a major nor
minor dispute existed. There was no major dispute be-
cause the decision to shut down operations did not seek
to change the terms of any collective bargaining agree-
ment. Neither was it a minor dispute because no clause in
the agreement would be violated by the company going
completely out of business. 167
The court cited with approval both Northeast and Japan
Air Lines, while distinguishing Telegraphers, Galveston
Wharves and ALPA v. Wien Air Alaska, Inc. 16 on the ground
that they did not involve a decision to go completely out
of business.169
Judge Bramwell, writing for the court, referred to First
National's emphasis on the need for freedom of action and
the danger of strategic behavior on the union's part if de-
lay of the decision were to occur. The court further
pointed out that since the duty to bargain is similar under
quirement. There is also an indication, however, that the union claimed anti-
union animus on the part of the company. For example, see the court's reference
to the union's argument about "lock-out" and " 'self-help' related to pending ne-
gotiations over new collective agreements." Id. at 2687.
1- Id. at 2686.
16 Id. There is an obvious error in the court's reasoning. The standard for
determining whether a dispute is minor is not whether it violates a clause of the
agreement, but whether it may be argued that it does so. For the standards used
by other courts, see supra notes 122-132 and accompanying text.
1-" 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3388 (D. Alaska 1984). This case involved a temporary
shut down of an air carrier for the purpose of reorganizing operations. The court
found that the dispute over management's decision to shut down constituted a
major dispute. The court adopted a rather substantive approach to the distinction
between major and minor disputes. "[T]he rule [to determine major and minor
disputes] must be applied by looking to the substantive nature of the dispute
rather than its formalistic appearance or to the manner in which the dispute oc-
curred." Id. at 3390. The court refused to hold that the mere existence of a fur-
lough provision in the collective bargaining agreement rendered the dispute
"international" and thus, minor. Id.
169 Transamerica, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2686.
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both NLRA and RLA, First National, an NLRA case, is ap-
plicable to RLA disputes. Unfortunately, the court failed
to adequately emphasize First National's dictum that the
duty to bargain under the two acts is not coextensive. 170
Probably realizing that the RLA's concern with the free
flow of commerce is greater than that shown in the NLRA,
the court stated that no major problem in the flow of com-
merce would be created since competitive carriers would
acquire the charter services.
Transamerica also cites Darlington for support of its hold-
ing that no bargaining is required over an employer's de-
cision to permanently shut down his business. 17  As
noted by the court, "the very suggestion that a carrier
would go completely out of business in order to obtain
leverage in contract negotiations with its union makes no
sense."'
172
After finding that there was no likelihood of success for
the union on the merits of the case, the court denied a
preliminary injunction.'M The court also based this de-
nial on a determination that the employees would not suf-
fer any irreparable harm as a result of the denial, and that
the balance of hardships tipped in Transamerica's
favor. 174 .
The significance of Transamerica is that it was the first
case to apply First National in an RLA context. 75 The
case's actual holding is of reduced significance because
170 See supra notes 113-118 and accompanying text for a discussion of First
National.
,7 Transamerica, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2687.
172 Id. The same argument was made by the Supreme Court in Darlington, 380
U.S. at 263. See supra text accompanying notes 107-112. The Darlington Court,
however, also emphasized that if the company going out of business is owned by
someone engaged in other businesses, the court should examine whether the
owner is trying to exert pressure on the other businesses' employees. Fortunately
the Transamerica court did not examine the facts for this type of conduct. See ALPA
v. Transamerica Airlines, 817 F.2d 510, 512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963
(1987) (Transamerica was actually trying to transfer its business to another of its
subsidiaries).
'7- Transamerica, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2688.
174 Id.
175 See McDonald, supra note 9, at 907.
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Darlington had already affirmed the right of an employer to
go completely out of business. Furthermore, complete
shut-downs are uncommon in the airline industry.
Other courts did not follow Transamerica by applying
First National in RLA cases until the Supreme Court de-
cided Pittsburgh & Lake Erie. Until that case, it was typi-
cally acknowledged that the scope of bargainable issues
under the RLA was "extremely broad" and "compre-
hended fields frequently reserved to management in other
industrial contexts."1 76 Such an approach was adopted
recently by the District Court for the District of Columbia
in ALPA v. Eastern Air Lines,'" discussed immediately
below.
b. ALPA v. Eastern Air Lines
ALPA v. Eastern Air Lines was decided in August 1988.
Although the district court's decision was overturned on
appeal, it is worth examining because it is the best exam-
ple of one of two possible approaches a court may take in
dealing with the problem under review.
The case involved Eastern Air Lines, an airline with a
history of stormy labor relations. Eastern was purchased
by Texas Air Corporation, owner of Continental Airlines,
a major air carrier with a very low level of unionization.
According to the court's findings, Eastern and Continen-
tal coordinated their efforts in order to frustrate the col-
lective bargaining representatives of Eastern, a heavily
unionized carrier. The labor tensions created led to ex-
tensive litigation with rather disappointing results for
Eastern.17 8 In the summer of 1988, Eastern decided to
176 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Eastern Air Lines, 849 F.2d 1481, 1487
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Akron & Barberton
Belt R.R., 385 F.2d 581, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1967)).
17 703 F. Supp. 962 (D.D.C.) [hereinafter, Eastern I], rev'd 863 F.2d 891 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
178 This litigation includes the following: IAM v. Eastern Air Lines, 849 F.2d
1481 (D.C. Cir. 1988); ALPA v. Eastern Air Lines, 683 F. Supp. 845 (D.D.C.
1988); Eastern Air Lines v. ALPA, 670 F.Supp. 947 (S.D. Fla. 1987); 1AM v. East-
ern Air Lines, 125 L.R.R.M. 3491 (D.C.C. 1987); ALPA v. Eastern Air Lines, No.
reorganize its operations according to a plan which,
among other things, included the closure of Eastern's
Kansas City hub. This plan would eliminate nearly 4000
jobs."7 9 The reorganization was an attempt to ameliorate
the company's precarious financial position. After consid-
ering the facts, the court found that management was pri-
marily responsible for the carrier's poor economic shape.
As proof of this finding, the court listed a series of trans-
actions between Eastern, Continental, and Texas Air Cor-
poration which drained funds from Eastern to the benefit
of the other companies.' 80 Throughout the opinion the
court implies that there was a plan on the part of Texas
Air Corporation's management to conduct business in a
manner that would strengthen the position of the non-un-
ionized, low-labor-cost Continental, at the expense of
Eastern. In support of these findings, the court also
noted a series of statements by Eastern's officials showing
a strong anti-union animus.' 8 1
Addressing the duty to bargain, the court found the
furloughing of 4000 employees unprecedented and thus
not part of the status quo. The court acknowledged that
"[m]anagerial prerogatives may become part of the status
quo if established by past practice," but that this was not
the case with Eastern.18 2 In response to the company's ar-
gument that its decision was motivated by business con-
siderations, the court cited Telegraphers for the proposition
that considerations of economic necessity are insufficient
to make a carrier's decision nonbargainable. 8 3 Accord-
ingly, the court ruled that "[m]assive lay-offs are not, and
shall never be, business as usual. The Railway Labor Act
requires Eastern to bargain with its unions before taking
unilateral action to eliminate 12 percent of its work
87-2143 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 1987). Eastern was mostly unsuccessful in this
litigation.
,79 Eastern I, 703 F. Supp. at 964.
1-' Id. at 968-69.
18, Id. at 970-72.
182 Id. at 974.
- Id. at 973-74.
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force."' 4 The court stated emphatically in broad and un-
reserved language that "[e]mployers subject to the RLA
must bargain with their unions even over fundamental de-
cisions affecting the very scope and direction of the em-
ployer's enterprise."'8l 5  Unimpressed by Eastern's
reliance on First National, the court noted that the
Supreme Court in that case required bargaining over the
effects of a decision "in a meaningful manner and at
meaningful times." 8 6
On the issue of major/minor distinction, the court
adopted the minority approach, stating that "[t]he distinc-
tion . . . must be applied by looking to the substantive
nature of the dispute rather than its formalistic appear-
ance or the manner in which the dispute occurred."'18 7
The court ultimately held that Eastern's severe furlough
plan was unsupported by any reasonable interpretation of
the existing collective bargaining agreement. 8 8
The court then summarily accused Eastern of trying to:
circumvent the bargaining process by unilaterally an-
nouncing that it will lay off 4000 workers without pursuing
the mandatory negotiation procedures. If the company is
allowed to furlough this large group of employees without
exhausting the bargaining procedures, it will not only alter
the status quo, but moot a central issue of the current
negotiations. 189
The court further accused the company of terminating
jobs which employees believed to be secure, thereby
sending a clear message that the unions are powerless to
protect their members.'°
Finally the court held that a status quo injunction in a
1- Id. at 974.
185 Id. at 975 (referencing Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie
R.R., 845 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2584 (1989). See infra notes
212-261 and accompanying text for a discussion of Pittsburgh & Lake Erie).
186 Eastern 1, 703 F. Supp. at 980 (quoting First National, 452 U.S. at 681-82).
187 Id. at 977.
188 Id.
1- Id. at 979.
1- Id. at 980.
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major dispute may be issued without consideration of the
equities of the case.' 9 ' Even if a balancing test was re-
quired, an injunction should issue because denial of such
relief would cause irreparable harm to the unions and em-
ployees.' 92 Clearly, the combination of the loss of 4000
jobs, the undermining of the unions' representation sta-
tus, and the resulting possible labor unrest would cause
irreparable harm to the unionized employees and to the
RLA's collective bargaining framework.' 93 The court
found that a lawful strike by the unions would cause the
airline, its employees, its customers, and the public more
economic hardship than the expense of retaining 4000
employees during the negotiations would cause the
carrier. 194
This decision is significant, apart from its unusually lib-
eral approach to labor relations, because of its attempt to
leave legal formalities behind and make a probing inquiry
into management's labor policy. Among disputes in-
vovling the duty to bargain, this case is alone in its at-
tempt to determine management's share of responsibility
for the company's financial troubles. Regardless of the
validity of the court's findings and the analysis of East-
ern's managerial policy, the fact that the court made a sin-
cere attempt to discover the truth, without accepting that
labor costs are the cause of every financial problem, is an
approach that if followed by other courts, will change the
shape of labor law in the United States.
1,' Id. at 981. "[Wlhere there is a major dispute, plaintiffs are not required to
establish the traditional equitable prerequisites of irreparable injury and a
favorable balance of harms in order to obtain immediate injunctive relief." Id.
1I3 ld. "Although a balancing ... is not necessary for a preliminary injunction
... plaintiffs have satisfied the traditional criteria for such relief." Id. The court
based its holding on the loss ofjobs and resulting harm to the bargaining relation-
ship between Eastern and the unions.
193 Id. The furlough of 4000 employees "could itself trigger lawful strikes
under the RLA and could irreparably damage the RLA's collective bargaining
framework .... " Id.
' Id. at 982. "A lawful strike by the three unions would however, cause eco-
nomic hardship to the airline, its employees, its customers and the general pub-
lic. . . . The Court concludes that the public interest will be best served by
maintaining the status quo." Id.
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To be sure, courts are generally not an appropriate
place for questioning business policies. Judges are not
trained to understand the complex economic issues that a
company faces in today's corporate world, and particu-
larly in an industry so complex, uncertain and risky for
entrepreneurs as the airlines. Certainly, however, the
courts are not to blame for becoming involved in such
complex inquiries. Rather, the blame lies with the preva-
lant labor jurisprudence in the United States which, by
making the distinction between mandatory and permissive
subjects of bargaining, has involved the courts in issues
better left at the bargaining table. From the moment the
court must designate appropriate bargaining subjects, it
cannot, and probably should not, avoid becoming in-
volved in an analysis of the accuracy and good faith of
management's financial arguments. The best solution is
not to say the courts should avoid this second-guessing,
but rather to remove the complex issues of collective bar-
gaining from the courts and put them back on the bar-
gaining table.
Not surprisingly, the district court's decision in Eastern I
was overturned within a month. The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the decision and
ruled that the case involved minor disputes. 195 Following
traditional methods of distinguishing between major and
minor disputes, 96 the court examined, separately, the
bargaining relationship between the carrier and each of
the three unions that had sued. 197 Hence, the court did
not discuss the furlough of 4000 employees, but rather
the particular furloughs of each class of employees, repre-
sented by each of the three unions. 98. The court thus
found, for example, that the furloughing of 1050 flight at-
tendants covered by the collective bargaining agreement
195 ALPA v. Eastern Air Lines, 863 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1988) [hereinafter, East-
ern III.
1- Id, at 895.




with Transport Workers Union of America (TWU) was
not unprecedented and did not, therefore, violate any es-
tablished practice.' 99 As to the pilots' and mechanics' fur-
loughs, the court found that they were contemplated by
the existing collective bargaining agreements which pro-
vided some protection for the employees. 20 0 According to
the court's rationale, the protection offered by the bar-
gaining agreement meant that as long as management ful-
filled the obligations stated therein, it was free to proceed
with its decisions.20 '
The court then examined the issue of anti-union animus
' Id. at 897-98. The court pointed to two large furloughs of flight attendants
as well as the broad language in the TWU collective bargaining agreement which
"evidences an awareness that work reductions might be necessary in the future."
Id. at 897. The court concluded that "the record compels a finding that Eastern's
proposal was covered by the collective bargaining agreement and the course of
dealing between the company and TWU." Id. at 898.
- Id. at 900 ("The agreement clearly contemplates large-scale furloughs").
201 Id. The district court had rejected this argument, stating:
While it is true that the collective bargaining agreements contain
furlough provisions, they provide no justification for a wholesale re-
structuring of the airline workforce. Instead, such provisions have
been used to implement minor operational "adjustments" and sea-
sonal schedule changes. Defendant cannot now use these provisions
to dismantle a significant portion of Eastern's labor force.
Eastern 1, 703 F. Supp. at 974.
The circuit court's majority opinion was strongly criticized by Judge Mikva,
who, writing for four circuit judges who dissented from the court's refusal to re-
hear the case en banc, stated:
It is of course implausible on its face to assert, as the panel does, that
the largest furlough in Eastern's history, undertaken at a time of un-
precedented bitterness in labor-management relations and affecting
thousands of employees, is not a major dispute. The whole purpose
of the RLA is to prevent inflammatory unilateral actions by either
side that threaten to disrupt national transportation.
Eastern II, 863 F.2d at 918 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
The circuit court's approach is characteristic of how meaningless legal formali-
ties can be used for the sole purpose of justifying a court's predetermined deci-
sion. The problem in Eastern II was not, as the decision would have us believe,
that some pilots, some flight attendants, and some mechanics were separately dis-
missed. Rather, the dispute was created by a single managerial decision to close
the carrier's Kansas City hub and certain gates at other airports. Eastern's deci-
sion to furlough these employees was part of one single plan to ameliorate the
financial situation of the company (assuming that management's claims about its
real motives were correct). Thus, the furloughs must be seen as a whole and in
this way compared to past practices. The approach adopted by the panel sees the
trees, but misses the forest.
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that was found to characterize the decisions of Eastern's
management.20 2 Applying the NLRB v. Wright Line2 °3 doc-
trine, developed under the NLRA, the court held that if a
decision containing anti-union considerations can be jus-
tified by other legitimate business considerations, the de-
cision is not illegal. 0 4 Citing the lower court's finding
that there were also legitimate business reasons for the
company's decision quite apart from anti-union feelings,
the court held the decision did not violate of the RLA's
protection of the right to unionize.20 5 Nevertheless, the
court re-examined the lower court's finding of anti-union
animus. °6 In a decision full of factual findings that is un-
usual at the appellate level, 0 7 the court held the allega-
tion that Eastern's affairs were conducted for the benefit
of non-unionized Continental was unsubstantiated by the
facts of the case.208
An interesting final point is the court's statement, in the
initial typed form of the opinion, that "to determine
whether the status quo protected by [the RLA] encom-
passed an entitlement in the ALPA and IAM members to
be immune from a furlough such as the present one, we
202 Eastern H, 863 F.2d at 900.
2o3 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
20 Eastern H, 863 F.2d at 902.
205 Id. at 903. "We are persuaded that the Wright Line principle is applicable
here.... Workers' Railway Labor Act rights to unionize are adequately protected
so long as management is limited to taking any measures that it would have taken
in the absence of any anti-union animus." Id.
20- Id. at 903.
207 Id. at 914 (Mikva, J., dissenting). This fact was severely criticized by Judge
Mikva in his dissent, in which he said:
This case convinces me that we should install a witness stand and a
jury box in the courtroom of this court of appeals. The panel's own
findings of fact are so extensive, and revise the district court's con-
clusions so completely, that they do genuine violence to the defer-
ence we owe to the determinations of our fellow judges on the
district court . . . .An administrative agency would have received
more deference than did the district judge in this case.
Id. at 914-15.
208 Id. at 905-07 (discussing various actions, such as work transfers and asset
transfers, taken by Texas Air affecting the operations of Eastern and Continental,
and concluding that "the evidence misses the crucial link between forbidden in-
tent and conduct").
look to the expired bargaining agreements and to past
practice. '2 0 9 The court here made an important shift in
the burden of proof. Generally, the issue is whether man-
agement's action is part of the status quo as determined
by reviewing the collective bargaining agreement and es-
tablished practice. In this case, however, the court ex-
amined whether the unions' claims to bargaining were
part of the status quo. The court thus shifted its focus,
and accordingly the burden of proof, from the actions of
the employer to the rights of employees. 1 ° Oddly, this
part of the court's reasoning was omitted from the final
edition of the panel's decision. The decision is in accord
with the line of cases that favor finding a minor dispute
regardless of the influence that such decisions have upon
employees' jobs.
Plainly, the distinction between major and minor dis-
putes is hardly clear cut. In understanding the confusion,
it is important to note that judges, accustomed to the dis-
tinction between mandatory and permissive subjects of
bargaining under the NLRA and the concept of manage-
ment prerogative which developed therein, are the delin-
eators of the distinctions between major and minor
disputes. The muddle is exemplified by the filing of six
separate opinions by the D.C. Circuit judges in Eastern H,
who rejected, by a narrow majority, the unions' petition
for rehearing en banc.2 1' As these judges, some of the best
20- See ALPA v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 192, at D-I
(Oct. 4, 1988).
21o Compare supra text accompanying note 209 with supra notes 66-78 and accom-
panying text (all discussing Toledo's holding). The Court in Toledo found that the
status quo was not violated if the employer's action had occurred in the past, to
the extent that it had become part of an established practice. Toledo, 396 U.S. at
153-54.
21, 863 F.2d at 892. Regarding the six separate opinions, Judge Mikva said:
Four statements have explained why the case should not be reheard
en banc, and two have advocated that it be so reheard. There have
appeared four different interpretations of how the Railway Labor
Act's system for classifying disputes as "major" or "minor" ought to
be applied in this case: the panel believes the dispute here is "mi-
nor"; Judge Silberman thinks it may be "major," but contends that
classifying it as "major" would not alter the outcome of the case;
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circuit judges in the United States, are unsettled in the
dispute, the need for guidelines and simpler solutions is
obvious.
c. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad v. Railway Labor
Executives' Association
At this point of total confusion concerning appropriate
boundaries of the duty to bargain over lay-offs and the
distinction between major and minor disputes, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie
Railroad v. Railway Labor Executives'Associaton 21 2 to provide
some guidance to the lower courts.21 3 Whether it suc-
ceeded in this quest is doubtful.
Facing severe financial problems, the Pittsburgh & Lake
Erie Railroad (P&LE) decided to sell its assets to Chicago
West Pullman Transportation Company (CWP), which
had previously engaged in road transportation only. 4
Under the terms of the sale, CWP would continue to op-
erate the railroad but would reduce the labor force from
750 to 250.215 When the sale agreement was announced
on July 8, 1987, the unions notified P&LE that they
wanted to bargain over the sale, but no formal proposal
was made at that time.2 16 Management denied any legal
obligation to bargain its decision with the unions, so the
unions proposed an amended collective bargaining agree-
ment designed to protect employees from the sale's ef-
Judge Edwards has proposed that the dispute may be both "major"
and "minor"; and I have argued that the dispute is "major" and that
this classification would affect the result.... These disparate views,
it seems to me, suggest that the panel opinion cannot serve as any
significant guidepost in this circuit on these difficult and unsettled
areas of law.
Id. at 919 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
212 109 S. Ct. at 2584.
2'3 See Campbell & Hiers, supra note 9, at 344 (stating the hope that "the carri-
ers will finally receive [from the Supreme Court] additional direction concerning
this management prerogative dilemma").
24 Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, 109 S. Ct. at 2588.
215 Id.
21 cId
fects.2 t7 The employer again refused to bargain and the
union went on strike. 18 Meanwhile, the Interstate Com-
merce Commission approved the proposed sale and re-
fused to impose any Labor Protective Provisions.2 1 9 The
dispute ended in the courts where the unions sought an
injunction against the sale, pending the exhaustion of bar-
gaining procedures under the RLA, and the employer
sought an injunction against the strike.220  The district
court ruled that the dispute was major, that the status
quo, as far as the existing jobs were concerned, should be
maintained, and that the company had a duty to bargain
over its decision's effects.2 2 On appeal, the Third Circuit
affirmed the lower court's decision, by finding "little diffi-
culty in concluding that the railroad's decision to sell its
rail assets and the consequential elimination of a substan-
tial number of rail jobs presents a so-called 'major dis-
pute' under the Railway Labor Act and, therefore, that the
railroad must bargain over the effects of that decision. 212 2
Citing Toledo,223 Judge Becker, writing for the majority,
concluded that "the very existence of the workers' jobs"
was covered by the "objective working conditions" ex-
isting when the dispute arose, which Toledo held to be part
2" Id. The union's proposals were the following:
1. No employee.., shall be deprived of employment or placed in a
worse position with respect to compensation or working conditions
for any reason except resignation, retirement, death or dismissal for
justifiable cause ....
2. If an employee is placed in a worse position .... that employee
shall receive, in addition to a make-whole remedy, penalty pay equal
to three times the lost pay, fringe benefits and consequential dam-
ages suffered by such employee.
3. P&LE agrees to obtain binding commitments from any pur-
chaser of its rail line operating properties and assets to assume all [P
& LE's] collective bargaining agreements.
Id. at 2589-90 n.5.
218 Id. at 2590.
219 Id. at 2590-91; see supra note 158.
220 See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R., 677 F.
Supp. 830 (W.D. Pa. 1987), aft'd, 845 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct.
2584 (1989).
221 Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, 677 F. Supp. at 835.
222 Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, 845 F.2d at 423.
22s 396 U.S. at 142; see supra notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
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of the status quo.224
The court deemed First National inapplicable to RLA
disputes since "NLRA and RLA cases are not freely inter-
changeable, as the two statutes have distinctly different
histories and different approaches to the problem of la-
bor-management relations. ' 22 5 Even if First National were
applicable to RLA cases, the court explained, bargaining
over the decision's effects is required and, during negotia-
tions, the status quo must be maintained. 26
Despite the uniquely managerial nature of the case,
Judge Becker relied on Telegraphers for the proposition
that the Supreme Court clearly encourages RLA bargain-
ing over the effects of a decision.2 " According to Judge
Becker, Telegraphers implicitly rejected "the idea that a
subject is off-limits to RLA bargaining merely because it
could be labeled a 'managerial prerogative.' ",228 Ac-
knowledging that its decision would have a "profound
and damaging effect on [the company's] very ability to
proceed with the transaction," the court excused this re-
sult by stating that "the power of delay and the leverage
given to labor is inherent in the design of the RLA, and
surely was understood and contemplated by its
framers."229
The Supreme Court granted certiorari230 to resolve a
division among those circuits that had faced the company
sale problem and the duty to bargain in connection there-
2, Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, 845 F.2d at 428.
225 Id. at 429.
22" Id. at 431.
227 Id. "[I]n spite of the unique managerial nature of [Telegraphers], the Supreme
Court has plainly countenanced RLA bargaining over the effects of the decision."
Id.
228 Id. at 430.
229 Id. at 432 n.15. In the second part of its decision, the Third Circuit rejected
the company's argument that since the transaction was approved by ICC without
any labor protective provisions, there is no duty to bargain over the effects of the
approved transaction. Id. at 433. This argument, also rejected by the Supreme
Court, is of limited importance for the airlines.
230 Pittsburgh & Lake Erie v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2584
(1989).
with.23 ' A five member majority reversed the lower
court's ruling that there was no duty to bargain over the
decision to sell, and thus rejected the lower court's stance
that such a decision was covered by management's
prerogative.3
Speaking for the majority, Justice White virtually shifted
the court's focus from the efects of the decision to sell to
the decision itself. Instead of trying to see whether the
massive lay-offs were part of the company's past practice,
he searched for "an implied agreement that P&LE would
not go out of business, would not sell its assets, or if it
did, would protect its employees from the adverse conse-
quences of such action. 2 3 3 Finding no such agreement,
the Court denied that the company's decision changed the
status quo.
The majority had difficulty with the Toledo precedent,
which included in the status quo actual working condi-
tions and practices in effect prior to the pending dis-
pute.23 4 In response to the unions' argument that Toledo's
broad language covered the existence of job positions,
Justice White first criticized Toledo for extending "the rele-
vant language of [the RLA] to its outer limits, ' 23 5 and,
second, distinguished the case on its facts.2 3 6 Finally, and
most significantly, the majority distinguished Toledo on the
231 See, e.g., Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
855 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1988); Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Galveston
Wharves, 849 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1988) (requiring railroad to bargain with union
over consequences of sale and lease).
232 Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, 109 S. Ct. at 2595-96. The decision did not deal with
the major/minor distinction. Rather, the issue was whether collective bargaining
was precluded by managerial prerogative. Id.
23 Id. at 2593. In its initial decision, the three-member panel of the district
court in Eastern I applied a similar analysis. See supra text accompanying notes
209-210.
2- Toledo, 396 U.S. at 142. See supra text accompanying notes 66-78 for a dis-
cussion of Toledo.
" Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, 109 S. Ct. at 2594.
2-6 Id. In distinguishing Toledo, the Court noted that the employer's decision
affected an "unquestioned practice for many years, and [the Supreme Court,
thus,] considered it reasonable for employees to deem it sufficiently established
that it would not be changed without bargaining and compliance with the status
quo provisions of RLA." Id.
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basis that "it did not involve the decision to quit the rail-
road business, sell its assets, and cease to be a railroad
employer at all."123 7
In support of his holding, Justice White surprisingly
cited Darlington, a case involving a total closure rather
than a sale.2 8 With regard to his reliance on that case,
Justice White explained:
Although Darlington arose under NLRA, we are convinced
that we should be guided by the admonition in that case
that the decision to close down a business entirely is so
much a management prerogative that only an unmistaka-
ble expression of congressional intent will suffice to re-
quire the employer to postpone a sale of its assets pending
the fulfillment of any duty it may have to bargain over the
subject matter of union notices such as were served in this
case. Absent statutory direction to the contrary, the deci-
sion of a railroad employer to go out of business and con-
sequently to reduce to zero the number of available jobs is
not a change in the conditions of employment forbidden
by the status quo provision of [the REA]23 9
In a footnote, Justice White addressed Telegraphers, dis-
tinguishing it on the basis that only a partial closure was
involved, rather than a decision to go completely out of
business.24 °
The Pittsburgh & Lake Erie decision stressed that a status
quo injunction would cancel the sale and thus frustrate
the Congressional policy encouraging both the deregula-
tion of the rail and air industries and the assistance of
small, financially troubled rail carriers,.2 4  a policy evi-
237 Id.
2" Darlington, 380 U.S. at 263. For a discussion of the case, see supra notes 108-
112 and accompanying text.
21 Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, 109 S. Ct. at 2595-96.
2- Id. at 2595 n.17. Justice White explained that "[n]otwithstanding the policy
considerations prompting the enlarged scope of mandatory bargaining under the
RLA, in light of Darlington, which First National Maintenance reaffirmed, we are not
inclined to extend Telegraphers to a case in which the railroad decides to retire from
the railroad business." Id.
241 Id. at 2597. The decision refers to the various amendatory acts passed in the
1970s and 1980s. See, e.g., the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No.94-210, 90 Stat. 30, (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 802 (1982 &
denced by the ICC's authority to approve and disapprove
railroad sales. The Court concluded that a union's de-
mand to bargain over a decision to sell, once the sale has
been announced, cannot justify a status quo injunction
that would "postpone the sale beyond the time the sale
was approved by the Commission and was scheduled to
be consummated. ' 242 It did, however, recognize that ef-
fects bargaining could occur in the time period between
the plan's announcement and the sale's consummation.243
Finally, the Court unanimously found that ICC approval
of the sale did not prohibit the union from entering a
strike in connection with issues covered by the effects bar-
gaining, provided the strike conformed with the RLA's
provisions.244
The dissent relied primarily on Telegraphers, noting that
[T]here is no relevant difference between the partial aban-
donment in Telegraphers and the transfer of ownership pro-
posed in this case: in both, rail service would continue as
before, but many employees would lose their jobs ....
Had the sale in this case proceeded, the railroad would
have operated the same service with a work force of 250 as
compared to 750 employees. The economic benefits of
that reduction are as obvious as those that would have
been achieved by closing obsolete stations on the railroad
Supp. V 1987)), and the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat.
1895, (codified at 49 U.S.C. 10101 (1982)). By amending the Interstate Com-
merce Act with regard to the ICC's regulatory authority, Congress attempted to
revitalize the ailing railroad industry. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie 109 S. Ct. at 2596-97.
242 Id. at 2597. The Court emphasized that at this point, it was not addressing
the issue concerning the consequences of unions demanding bargaining over la-
bor protective provisions before any plan of sale has been announced. Id.
243 Id. at 2597. (The Court observed that "to the extent that the unions' propos-
als could be satisfied by P & LE itself, [the effects of the sale upon the employees]
were bargainable but only until the date for closing the sale arrived.").
244 Id. at 2598. The Court refers to a strike against the selling employer. The
Court did not deal at all with what happens after the sale is consummated. The
question remains whether the contract survives in this situation. If it does not, is
the employer required to bargain with the union of the purchased company? See
supra note 156 and accompanying text for further discussion of these issues. See
also Gallagher, Procedures for Determining Representation Following Mergers and Acquisi-
tions, in CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF 99 (J. McKelvey ed. 1988).
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system in Telegraphers.245
Noting the inconsistency of the decision with Toledo, the
dissent criticized the majority's reliance on Darlington and
First National because those cases involved unregulated in-
dustries, dissimilar to the highly regulated railroad indus-
try. The dissent concluded that:
Perhaps the RLA's restrictions on [the freedom of the em-
ployer to leave the market], as interpreted in Telegraphers
and Shore Line, do not best serve national transportation
interests. But since Congress has not overruled those in-
terpretations, it is, as Judge Becker observed, inappropri-
ate for judges to undertake to fill the perceived policy
void.246
When reviewing this 5-4 decision, it becomes apparent
that the Court went too far in its attempt to save the sale,
which it considered the best solution for the viability of
the company. The problem with this decision is not only
that it undertook to achieve something best left to Con-
gress, but also, that it totally disregarded established
precedents and the structure and philosophy of the RLA.
Three primary bases exist for the holding in Pittsburgh &
Lake Erie: its reliance on Darlington, its attempt to distin-
guish Telegraphers, and its interpretation of status quo
under the RLA. As discussed below, the Supreme Court
erred on all three points.
First, the Court incorrectly relied upon Darlington. Not
only was Darlington governed by the NLRA,247 which the
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized as having a dif-
ferent structure and philosophy than RLA,248 but it was
also based on a managerial decision to totally shut down
and liquidate an entire business, rather than to sell as a
245 Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, 109 S. Ct. at 2602 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
246 Id. at 2603.
247 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
248 See First National, 452 U.S. at 686-87 n.23; Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. United
Transp. Union, 402 U.S. at 579 n. 11.
going concern, as in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie.249 The differ-
ence is not only conceptual. From a labor point of view,
the difference is critical. Unlike a total closure, the sale of
a business does not terminate its operations as jobs con-
tinue to exist and labor relations remain. The only com-
mon element is that one employer ceases to exist. Labor
law, however, is not concerned with the subjective situa-
tions of each party. Its primary concern is the reality of
industrial relations within a company attempting to func-
tion in society. It is from this point of view that labor laws
should be interpreted. To analogize, for labor law pur-
poses, a total closure to a sale of a business is simply in-
correct. The business continues to exist. If this fact is
insufficient to support a holding that an unexpired con-
tract survives the sale of a business,2 5 0 employees should
at least have some say in a decision that significantly af-
fects their jobs.2 5 '
Furthermore, a decision to sell a business is much more
amenable to negotiations than a decision to close a busi-
ness. The alternatives that a union may offer to negotiate
are much more varied in the case of a sale. A union may
seek to preserve jobs after the sale and bind the purchaser
of the company to other conditions. The issues do not
exist in the context of a total closure of a business.
Moreover, the employer's interest in freely implement-
ing his decisions is much greater in the case of a total
shut-down and liquidation of the company than in the
case of a sale. In a sale, the timing of going out of busi-
249 See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
250 The issue is not settled even under the NLRA. See Bernstein & Cooper,
Labor Law Consequences of the Sale of a Unionized Business, 36 LAB. LJ. 327 (1985);
Krupman & Kaplan, The Stock Purchaser After Burns: Must He Buy the Union Contract?,
31 LAB. LJ. 328 (1980).
231 The problem of bargaining over mergers would be less acute if a labor con-
tract survived the sale of a business. In such a case, the employees would have a
low level of interest in the sale because it would only nominally impact their em-
ployment. Under current American labor law, however, it is highly unlikely that a
contract survives a company's sale. Interestingly, in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, the
contract did not survive the agreement. 109 S. Ct. at 2588 n.3.
252 See id. at 2589-90 n.5, for the union's proposals.
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ness depends much less on managerial decisions than in
the case of liquidation. Bargaining with the buyer is an
uncertain process, and when negotiations begin, the seller
never knows whether or when the sale will be concluded.
If collective bargaining takes place at this point, manage-
ment's right to go out of business is not violated because
management itself has not yet reached a final decision on
the matter.
Finally, despite the recent wave of deregulation in the
airline and railroad industries, both remain somewhat
regulated. Indeed, RLA was passed at a time of heavy in-
dustry regulation. Accordingly, an employer's expecta-
tions as to his freedom to act independently are
necessarily lower than in unregulated industries. 253 Re-
cently, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association,25 4
the Supreme Court ruled that in a regulated industry,
such as the railroads, employees have a diminished expec-
tation of privacy. 55 In that case, the public policy ration-
ale behind diminishing the employees' expectations was
that of public safety. In Pittsburgh v. Lake Erie, the public
policy rationale of preserving labor peace in an industry
vital to the economy is of equal importance.25 6 The
Court, it seems, should acknowledge that such a strong
public policy, which applies to regulated industries, and
has led to RLA's limitations on the right to strike,257 di-
minishes the employer's expectations in the free conduct
of his affairs.
The Supreme Court was also incorrect in attempting to
distinguish Telegraphers. Examining a partial closure of the
business, the Court in Telegraphers rejected the idea of de-
cision bargaining and insisted on effects bargaining. The
effects of both cases upon the employees shall be ex-
amined. The effects of a partial closure and a sale of a
253 Id. at 2603.
2- 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
255 Id. at 1418.
2-56 See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
2-7 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
business, as in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, would have been
identical for the employees. A large proportion of them
would lose their jobs. Yet, with the same effect on em-
ployees imminent, the Supreme Court essentially ruled in
Telegraphers that the decision of the employer could not be
initiated until bargaining under the RLA had been ex-
hausted. Thirty years later, under identical circum-
stances, the Supreme Court in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie held
the reverse. Instead of overruling Telegraphers, however, it
preferred to make unpersuasive distinctions. Even if
there is a difference between the Pittsburgh & Lake Erie sale
of a business and the partial closure in Telegraphers, the
difference is small when compared with Darlington's total
closure, on which the Court so heavily relied. 58
The Supreme Court did not limit itself to the analysis of
management prerogative. The union's clever move to file
notices for bargaining in accordance with the RLA created
a status quo obligation for the employer to maintain dur-
ing bargaining over the effects of the sale. This bargain-
ing was authorized by the Court. Thus, the Court had to
determine whether this status quo prevented the abolition
of negotiated jobs. Unfortunately, the Court failed to
grasp this concept. Justice White questioned whether the
decision to sell was prohibited by the existing status quo.
This was not the correct question to ask. Status quo is not
related to business decisions but rather, to the "actual,
objective working conditions and practices, broadly con-
ceived.... 259 Working conditions do not involve busi-
ness decisions per se, but rather the job positions they
affect or even abolish. The change in the status quo in
Toledo was not the business decision to change the outly-
ing work assignments of the railroad, but rather the nega-
258 At first glance, it seems surprising that the Supreme Court did not rely on
First National, which was more recent and more influential than Darlington. There
is, however, an explanation: First National involved a partial closure. If Justice
White had relied on that decision, he would have had to explain why he found
First National more applicable than Telegraphers, which also involved a partial clo-
sure and, moreover, was governed by the RLA.
259 See Toledo, 396 U.S. at 153.
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tive way in which the employees were affected in their
work. Similarly, the Court in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie should
have looked at the abolition of 500 jobs and whether past
established practice gave examples of similar furloughs, in
which case there would have been no change in the status
quo by the employer. This analysis was applied by the
D.C. Circuit in Eastern H, when it ruled in favor of the em-
ployer.260 In refusing to follow the D.C. Circuit's lead, the
Supreme Court simply distorted the meaning of the status
quo.
Justice White additionally cast doubt upon the wisdom
of Toledo. Fortunately, he did not reverse the case out-
right, as he realized that this would create confusion in
the lower courts which have long relied on Toledo for con-
struing the meaning of status quo. This continued reli-
ance supports the contention that the Toledo court
correctly understood the meaning and purpose of the
RIA status quo requirements. The drafters of the RLA,
in imposing the status quo obligations, wanted parties to
abstain during negotiations from any moves which would
destroy the delicate bargaining climate. They wanted to
preventfait accomplis that would either render negotiations
purposeless or would anger the other party excessively.
Only a broad interpretation of the status quo provisions
can achieve this goal. Abolition of job positions is pre-
cisely the kind of decision that would destroy the climate
of trust which must exist during negotations.
The last point to make about the Pittsburgh & Lake Erie
decision concerns its effects bargaining rationale. By im-
posing the consummation of the sale as a deadline on col-
lective bargaining over effects, the Court virtually
destroyed any chance for negotiations to be fruitful. The
RLA is not like the NLRA. The National Labor Relations
Board has authority to scrutinize the employer's behavior
and good faith in collective bargaining. No such board
exists under the RLA, and courts have generally abstained
2- Eastern H, 863 F.2d at 891. For a discussion of the analysis, see supra note
201 and accompanying text.
from making such inquiries into the parties' behavior in
negotiations. The only legal pressure on the parties to
bargain seriously comes from the NMB's power to pro-
long bargaining indefinitely while an agreement is still
possible. The fear that the status quo will continue indefi-
nitely provides an incentive for the parties to bargain in
good faith. By imposing the sale's consummation as a
deadline, the Court alleviated this pressure. And while
the union is pressured by possible lay-offs to bargain seri-
ously, the employer has no such incentive. Thus the em-
ployer can behave as he pleases, 26' unlike the NLRA case
where at least he is pressured by the threat of the NLRB.
IV. SUGGESTIONS AS TO THE PRESENT STATE OF LAW
In this section, some conclusions will be drawn as to
where case law stands today. This task is not easy be-
cause, as has been shown so far, courts have taken contra-
dictory approaches to the issue of collective bargaining
over lay-offs. The confusion is even worse because eco-
nomic circumstances in the airline industry, as well as the
railroads, are rapidly changing in the eighties and nine-
ties. Today, when parties are unable to find mutually ac-
ceptable solutions, they resort to extensive litigation.
As previously mentioned, two legal questions arise in
the context of collective bargaining over lay-offs under
the RLA. First, is the employer's decision part of manage-
ment prerogative which precludes collective bargaining?
If not, is bargaining precluded under express or implied
arrangements arising from the parties' relationship? Sec-
ond, should this question be resolved by arbitration, or
should collective bargaining be required in the absence of
any explicit contrary agreements? Each question will be
examined separately in an attempt to bring some order to
261 See Pittsburgh & Lahe Erie, 109 S. Ct. at 2600 n.7. "If the railroad knows its
obligations will end when the sale is consummated, it will have no incentive to
expedite bargaining. Thus the Court's imposition of a minimal bargaining duty
affords employees scarcely more protection than they would have absent any
duty." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the confusion that has clouded the lay-off bargaining
issue.
A. Management Prerogative v. Major/Minor Disputes
The management prerogative issue was addressed by
the Supreme Court in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie v. Railway La-
bor Executives' Association.262 As clearly enunciated in that
opinion, the announcement of an employer's decision to
sell his business or to shut it down is considered a mana-
gerial prerogative under the RLA and is not subject to
union override. In RLA terms, it is not a union-manage-
ment dispute. Therefore, it can be neither major nor mi-
nor. Effects bargaining may take place, but the
consummation of the sale imposes a strict deadline upon
the negotiations, a deadline beyond which the status quo
cannot be maintained. 26
3
Despite Pittsburgh & Lake Erie's clear holding, many
questions remain unanswered. For example, what will
happen in the case of a partial closure as seen in Eastern
H? Furthermore, if a union seeks bargaining over the ef-
fects of a possible sale, and negotiations begin with the
status quo maintained, can the employer suddenly an-
nounce, in the midst of negotiations, a decision to sell,
claiming that the mediation services of the NMB will not
continue beyond the execution of the sales contract?
The Supreme Court failed to address these problems.
On the issue of partial closure, the court only mentioned,
without reversing, Telegraphers. On the employer interrup-
262 109 S. Ct. 2584 (1989).
263 Negotiations with the new employer may continue after the sale of the busi-
ness. Given that the Supreme Court is reluctant to hold that a contract survives
the change of employer, however, it is highly unlikely that the Court will hold that
the successor employer is bound by the status quo obligations of his predecessor.
Bargaining without status quo requirements under the RLA is meaningless. See
supra notes 60-6 1. Thus, with its unfortunate decision in Pittsburgh &Lake Erie, the
Supreme Court left the employees without either influence over the sale of their
company or protection from its adverse effects. Given the representation
problems that arise after a merger, it is arguable that the option to strike is, in
reality, unavailable and the employees are left defenseless. See supra note 156 and
accompanying text.
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tion issue, the court merely said that it did not "deal with
a railroad employer's duty to bargain in response to a
union's § 156 duty to [bargain] notice proposing labor
protection provisions in the event that a sale, not yet con-
templated, should take place."126 What should a lower
court do when dealing with those issues or other similar
issues such as subcontracting, not mentioned by Pittsburgh
& Lake Erie?
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, which actually inserted the con-
cept of management prerogative into the RLA, should be
viewed as an exception to long-established case law. As
such, it should be interpreted restrictively. As previously
discussed, the reasoning in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie is weak
and results in an unfortunate innovation. It should not be
extended to cover other cases. Telegraphers governs the
partial closures issue. Other types of managerial deci-
sions, not covered by Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, should not
deviate from the traditional approach that recognizes the
extensive scope of the duty to bargain under RLA. After
all, Pittsburgh & Lake Erie acknowledged that "policy con-
siderations prompting the enlarged scope of mandatory
bargaining" exist under the RLA.265
This suggestion not only conforms with long estab-
lished precedents, but also with legislative history and the
philosophy behind the RLA. The RLA was built on the
theory that the right to strike should be limited in ex-
change for a more cooperative bargaining relation be-
tween the parties. As one writer put it, "[t]he RLA is a
collective bargaining statute. Its whole emphasis is on the
full acceptance of that bilateral relationship and the free
exercise of both parties' rights in determining rates of
pay, rules and working conditions, but with the duty im-
posed to seek to avoid interruptions to commerce. "266
The question that arises is whether the law intended to
2- Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, 109 S. Ct. at 2597 n.19.
265 Id. at 2595; see supra text accompanying note 240.
2- Burgoon, Mediation Under the Railway Labor Act, in RLA AT Fivry, supra note
12, at 73.
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limit the duty to bargain when decisions seriously affect-
ing employees' jobs are involved. The RLA was a confir-
mation of a practice favoring extensive collective
bargaining, which already existed in the railroad industry.
The unique circumstances under which the RLA was en-
acted were primarily a result of the broad view of bargain-
able subjects. The congressional hearings reports state
that "as long as the right of the employer to conduct his
own business is an essential to business and is part of ac-
cepted business practice, it must be clear that the freedom
of the employee to act equally to protect his own interest
should be equally preserved. 26 7 Even more interesting is
the statement that: "the way to industrial peace and har-
mony is ... to provide for the fair ironing out of all their
disputes across the table, in such a manner that each party
can feel it has been fairly represented and fairly treated in
the negotiations.12 68 The drafters of the agreement thus
believed that the interests of each side must be respected
equally and that their freedom to negotiate should be
channeled through collective bargaining. That is why Jus-
tice Frankfurter once said that "[t]he assumption as well
as the aim of that Act is a process of permanent confer-
ence and negotiation between the carriers on the one
hand and the employees through their unions on the
other.1'269
The whole structure of the RIA is based on the premise
that no external force should intervene in the collective
bargaining process, with the sole exception of the Na-
tional Mediation Board (NMB). And this exception is evi-
dence of the statute's policy that NMB intervention is
intended to assist parties in their bargaining. Bargaining
was considered so important by the parties that the only
external interference they accepted was one that would
267 Hearings, supra note 25.
26 Id. For the importance attributed by the Supreme Court to these state-
ments, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
2 9 Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 753 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
both prolong bargaining and maintain the status quo to
an extent unknown to the NLRA. Apart from this excep-
tion, the parties refused any other intervention. Neither
the NMB nor the President's emergency commission have
the power to impose their will upon the parties. 7 ° Signifi-
cantly, the RIA provides for no administrative agency
such as the NLRB, which has broad powers to control and
impose penalties upon parties for their conduct in collec-
tive bargaining. Thus, any attempt to limit the scope of
the duty to bargain under the RLA, by inviting the courts
to intervene and determine bargainable subjects, actually
violates the legislative purpose of the Act.27' Instead of
the parties bargaining over subjects important to them,
the courts may now substitute their own judgment for that
of the interested parties. Moreover, the absence of an ad-
ministrative agency like NLRB, with its history of experi-
ence, leaves the courts unguided in their attempt to define
bargainable issues, creating even more confusion than
under the NLRA.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court in First National
wisely felt the need to distinguish Telegraphers on the
ground that the duty to bargain under the RLA is not co-
extensive with that duty under the NLRA. In a frequently
quoted phrase in Telegraphers "whose specific relevance to
270 Even the emergency commission, which is created in cases of serious threat
against the national transporation system, has not the power to make binding rec-
ommendations. The commission is rather seen as a pressure upon the parties to
find a solution by bargaining. See supra note 49.
271 Cf Elgin, 325 U.S. at 751.
The nature and the history of the industry, the experience with
unionization of the [rail] roads, the concentration of authority on
both sides of the industry in negotiating collective agreements, the
intimacy of relationship between the leaders of the two parties
shaped by a long course of national, or at least regional, negotia-
tions, the intricate technical aspects of these agreements and the
specialized knowledge for which their interpretation and application
call .... these and similar considerations admonish against mutilat-
ing the comprehensive and complicated system governing railroad
industrial relations by episodic utilization of inapposite judicial
remedies.
Id. at 752. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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the R.I.A. is often overlooked, 2 7 2 Justice Jackson said:
"[E]ffective collective bargaining has been generally con-
ceded to include the right of the representatives of the
unit to be consulted and to bargain about the exceptional
as well as the routine rates, rules and working condi-
tions. ' 273 This view was recognized recently in Interna-
tional Association of Machinists v. Eastern Air Lines when the
D.C. Circuit noted that under the RLA, the duty to bar-
gain is "'extremely broad' " and " 'has comprehended
fields frequently reserved to management in other indus-
trial contexts.' "274 In his dissent in ALPA v. Eastern Air
Lines, Judge Mikva accurately described the traditional
RLA jurisprudence when he explained that "the RLA en-
visions a much greater role for unions in decisions to scale
back operations. "275
B. Major v. Minor Disputes
Even if a decision is not within the scope of managerial
prerogative, a court might nonetheless find the dispute to
be minor, and thus bargaining is precluded and status quo
maintenance is not required. In cases involving the duty
to bargain under the RLA, courts generally avoided, at
least until Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, getting involved in the
concept of management prerogative. Instead, the courts
speak in terms of the distinction between major and mi-
nor disputes. This is not a coincidence. On one hand, the
Telegraphers precedent made it very difficult, if not impossi-
ble, for lower courts to talk about management preroga-
tive as precluding collective bargaining. On the other
hand, if an employer succeeds in characterizing a dispute
as minor, he gains several advantages. Specifically, the
272 See Weber, supra note 26, at 57.
213 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & North W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330, 347
(1960).
274 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Eastern Air Lines, 849 F.2d 1481, 1487
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Akron & Barberton Belt
R.R., 385 F.2d 581, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 923 (1968)).
275 ALPA v. Eastern Air Lines, 863 F.2d 891, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Mikva, J.,
dissenting).
employer may implement his decision immediately, given
the reluctance of the courts to issue status quo injunctions
over minor disputes. Additionally, the unions are pre-
cluded from striking over minor disputes.
In Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, the Supreme Court did not ad-
dress the major/minor dispute issue, since it found the
employer's decision to be covered by managerial preroga-
tive. Therefore, Elgin is the seminal decision dealing with
the distinction. 276 The Supreme Court, in that case, dis-
tinguished the two classes of disputes in the context of
collective bargaining agreements:
[Major disputes] arise where there is no such agreement
or where it is sought to change the terms of one, and
therefore the issue is not whether an existing agreement
controls the controversy. They look to the acquisition of
rights for the future, not to assertion of rights claimed to
have vested in the past.
[Minor disputes], however, contemplate[ ] the existence
of a collective agreement already concluded or, at any
rate, a situation in which no effort is made to bring about a
formal change in terms or to create a new one. The dis-
pute relates either to the meaning or proper application of
a particular provision with reference to a specific situation
or to an omitted case.277
These definitions are constantly quoted by courts, espe-
cially those adopting an approach that favors minor dis-
putes. The court in Elgin seems to view the distinction
between major and minor disputes in terms of rights and
interests disputes. This approach justifies a ruling finding
a dispute to be minor whenever the employer can point to
a provision of the agreement or to past practice that ar-
guably justifies his challenged act. The question becomes
one of interpretation, and therefore, according to Elgin,
would constitute a minor dispute. Dispute characteriza-
tion is not so simple, however. In another part of the El-
276 Elgin, 325 U.S. at 723.
277 id. at 723.
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gin opinion that is often neglected, the Supreme Court
states:
The [major disputes] present the large issues about which
strikes ordinarily arise .... Because they more often in-
volve those consequences and because they seek to create
rather than to enforce contractual rights, they have been
left for settlement entirely to the processes of noncompul-
sory adjustment.
The so-called minor disputes, on the other hand, involv-
ing grievances, affect the smaller differences which inevita-
bly appear in the carrying out of major agreements and
policies or arise incidentally in the course of an employ-
ment. They represent specific maladjustments of a de-
tailed or individual quality. They seldom produce strikes,
though in exaggerated instances they may do so. Because
of their comparatively minor character and the general im-
probability of their causing interruption of peaceful rela-
tions and of traffic, the 1934 Act sets them apart from
major disputes ... 278
Managerial decisions which result in massive layoffs are
precisely the types of disputes that cause strikes. These
types of disputes certainly are not of "comparatively mi-
nor character" unlikely to cause "interruption of peaceful
relations." Thus, Elgin also gives support to the other ap-
proach for distinguishing between major and minor dis-
putes. That is the method that determines, in close cases,
the characteristics of the dispute on the basis of its actual
importance. 79
As the foregoing reveals, existing precedent is inade-
quate to provide the proper criteria for distinguishing be-
tween major and minor disputes. For this reason, a more
278 Id. at 723-25. See Local 553, Transp. Workers Union v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc., 695 F.2d 668, 674 (2d Cir. 1983) (emphasizing the major/minor distinction).
279 See also Hearings on H.R. 7650 Before Committee on Interstate Commerce, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1934). Commissioner Eastman testified before Congress that
"the national adjustment board is to handle only the minor cases growing out of
grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements." Id. Given
the fact that at that time disputes had not yet been characterized as major and
minor, it is apparent that the use of the word "minor" reflects the actual impor-
tance the drafters had in mind about these disputes.
practical solution should be advanced. First, there should
be a distinction between the cases in which the contract
has expired and those in which its term is still running.
When the contract has expired, the solution should be ob-
vious: the dispute is always major. Even if the parties'
contract gave the employer the right to unilaterally lay off
employees, when the contract expires, a new situation
arises. The parties can then renegotiate whatever they
want (as long as it is not covered, as a matter of law, by
managerial prerogative) and rearrange their prior alloca-
tion of rights. A collective agreement does not freeze for-
ever a particular distribution of rights and obligations.
The very fact that it has a fixed term means that the alloca-
tion is temporary and subject to renegotiation when the
contract expires.
The above statements are so obvious to those familar
with labor law, it is a wonder that they have not become
settled law. There are two likely reasons for this. First,
most of the cases dealing with the major/minor distinc-
tion arise in the railroad industry, where labor contracts,
unlike those in the airline industry, do not have a definite
term. Unfortunately, some courts dealing with airline dis-
putes fail to recognize this fundamental difference and
thus incorrectly apply railroad precedents in analyzing the
major/minor distinction. Second, quite simply, hard
cases make bad law. In this regard, courts hold that dis-
putes are rendered major if they concern issues agreed
generally to be subject to mandatory bargaining, and arise
after expiration of the bargaining agreement. 280 In con-
trast, courts have refused to deem disputes major if they
concern employee reduction decisions and arise after ex-
piration of the collective bargaining agreement. This re-
fusal is consistent with the First National philosophy that
280 See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Aloha Airlines, 776 F.2d 812
(9th Cir. 1985) (dispute over salaries and benefits deemed major); Air Cargo, Inc.
v. Local 851, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 733 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1984) (dispute over
weekend and overtime work during lay-offs held a "major" dispute).
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bargaining over such decisions should be required.28' In
fact, in its review of Aloha, the court in Eastern H distin-
guished Aloha because of its different managerial deci-
sion.282 This approach is plainly wrong. The type of
managerial decision is relevant only in determining
whether the matter is required by law to be bargained.
Once the matter is determined bargainable, the analysis
focuses on dispute characterization, which turns on the
post expiration viability of specific arrangements made
between the parties during the contract's term.
The problem becomes more difficult when the em-
ployer makes a decision that creates a labor dispute before
the expiration of the collective agreement. To determine
whether the dispute is major or minor, it is important to
keep in mind that bargaining, in a lay-off scenario, is not
precluded by the RILA, with the exceptions imposed by
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie. Thus, the union has a statutory
right to bargain over the lay-off decision. The question
then, is whether the union has waived its statutory right
for the duration of the contract. It is settled law that "the
waiver of a protected right must be expressed clearly and
unmistakably. 2 83 Under this approach the difficulty in
distinguishing major and minor disputes evaporates. Even
under the light burden many courts impose upon the em-
ployer to show that the dispute is minor, 84 the "clear and
unmistakable" approach makes it very difficult for the em-
ployer to show that his interpretation of the contract is
not "frivolous." In fact, a union probably has never
waived in "clear and unmistakable" terms its right to bar-
gain over lay-offs.285
28, ALPA v. Eastern, 863 F.2d at 898-99.
282 Id. at 899.
282 Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 n.12 (1983) (citing
with approval court of appeals decisions in several circuits).
284 See supra notes 129-16 and accompanying text.
283 This is not surprising. If the company is profitable, management will not
attempt to engage in the difficult negotiations that most matters entail. On the
other hand, if the company is financially troubled, the union will almost never be
persuaded to concede such a valuable right.
If implemented, this approach will reverse the tendency
of the courts to deem disputes minor, and thus bring
them more in line with the structure of the RLA. To the
extent that a statute can do so, the RIA is designed to
promote labor relations by equalizing the bargaining po-
sitions of the disputing parties. The situation in which
employers can legally make radical changes in existing
working conditions, by discharging large numbers of em-
ployees, while the unions are forbidden to strike because
the dispute is judicially characterized as minor, should not
be tolerated under the Act. Yet, this is exactly the situa-
tion created by the approach presently employed by a ma-
jority of courts.286
The unreasonableness of the approach favoring the
characterization of disputes as minor becomes more clear
when the no-win situation in which unions often find
themselves is considered. If, during usual negotiations
for contract renewal, the unions are able to get manage-
ment to agree to certain job security provisions, they then
face the possibility that if the employer makes a decision
involving lay-offs, the courts will use these provisions to
rule the dispute minor, arguing that they merely involve
the interpretation of the job-security clauses. 287 This, of
course, leaves the unions in a worse position than if they
had not obtained the protective provisions in the first
286 The prospect of arbitration offers little consolation to the employees, given
the courts' reluctance to issue status quo injunctions in minor disputes when job
losses are involved. But this rarely happens under the RLA. See supra text accom-
panying note 128. Considering the extent of the psychological harm caused to
employees and their families by furloughs-a harm which cannot be compensated
by monetary damages-the refusal by courts to find irreparable harm and there-
fore issue a preliminary injunction is of questionable wisdom. For an interesting
discussion of the problem under both the NLRA and the RLA, see Payne, En-
joining Employers Pending Arbitration - From M-K-T to Greyhound and Beyond, 3 IND.
REL. L. J. 169 (1979); cf Note, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements Under the
Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 71 VA. L. REV. 983, 985-86 (1985) (arguing that
many items in a labor relationship are not easily translated into monetary terms
and therefore only specific performance remedies can offer adequate protection
to the employees).
287 For a discussion of this approach in Eastern H, see supra text accompanying
note 201.
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place. If no provisions have been obtained, no "interpre-
tational" issue would exist, and the court would rule the
dispute major, requiring the employer to bargain with the
unions. To think that any legislative scheme would toler-
ate such a situation requires a lot of imagination.
There are also practical considerations which justify the
approach that favors characterizing disputes as major. Ar-
bitration in the airline industry is a time-consuming pro-
cess. A recent survey indicates that arbitration awards
now take more than two years to be issued.288 In airline
disputes, the delay can be even longer. If the arbitration
board decides that collective bargaining is required
before the implementation of the employer's decision, the
following unfortunate situation arises: two years after the
arbitration process started and the employer imple-
mented his decision to furlough a large number of em-
ployees,289 the arbitration board requires bargaining,
which may take another one or two years because of the
RLA's lengthy procedures. A case in point is ALPA v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc.290 In the months that passed after
the court ruled that Eastern's decision was minor, leaving
the airline free to lay off 4000 workers without bargaining,
the carrier filed bankruptcy and a bitter strike ensued.
One wonders what will happen if the arbitration board, to
which the case was sent by the courts, rules that bargain-
ing was required. It is doubtful that meaningful bargain-
ing can occur so many months after such drastic changes.
The situation is untenable both under the RLA and as a
matter of common sense.
What distinguishes airline disputes from other arbitra-
tion cases, apart from their impact on employees, is that
28, For a report on the the preliminary results of a survey conducted by Mark
Kahn and Dana Edward Eischen, see Grievances Are Growing Problem for Airlines, Un-
ions, Meeting Told, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 207, at A-4 (Oct. 27, 1989). The
results were announced in a conference of the Society of Professionals In Dispute
Resolution (S.P.I.D.R.) on Oct. 19, 1989 in Washington, D.C. Id.
289 This scenario assumes that no status quo injunction has been issued, as is
usually the case.
2- 863 F.2d at 891.
the arbitration procedure does not lead to definite and fi-
nal results. The arbitration board will not determine ac-
tual amounts of furlough payments, nor decide whether
or not the furlough is legal. The only thing the arbitra-
tion board may decide is whether bargaining was required
from the beginning. Thus, at the end of the arbitration
procedure, the employees might be back where they
started; bargaining must begin, but may now be meaning-
less. In sum, the preference that American courts show
for labor arbitration is understandable to the extent they
see the choice as between the courts and the arbitation
boards. The belief that the specialized boards are more
capable of handling the labor disputes than the courts ap-
pears to be justified. However, in an airline dispute, the
choice is not between the courts and the arbitration
boards, but between arbitration and collective bargaining.
Labor policy in this country is firmly in favor of collective
bargaining as the primary means of resolving conflicting
interests between labor and management.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has examined the duty of air carriers to bar-
gain with unions before implementing decisions leading
to lay-offs. The courts, in analyzing this duty, have inter-
preted the RLA in varying ways. The latest Supreme
Court decision on the issue has many flaws in its analysis,
and reveals a lack of familiarity with the philosophy and
structure of the RLA. Finally, this article determined that
management prerogative should be interpreted very re-
strictively under the RLA, and, in distinguishing major
and minor disputes, the courts should favor the former in
cases of employee reduction decisions.
The analysis was based primarily on legal arguments at-
tempting to provide solutions consistent with the RLA.
The RLA itself, however, was not examined to determine
if amendment is needed to provide more efficient solu-
tions. The economic implications the issues raise cannot
be ignored. In particular, those familiar with the RLA
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know the magnitude of the problems created by the
lengthy bargaining procedures under the RLA.29 ' What
must be emphasized here, however, is that the answers to
these economic problems involve delicate considerations
of various competing economic and social interests.
These interests were weighed by Congress when it en-
acted the RLA. The time has come for Congress to recon-
sider the balance it reached in the existing Act. For now,
courts should avoid such considerations if the doctrine of
separation of powers in this country means anything at all.
29, See Perritt, Aspects of Labor Law Affecting Labor-Management Cooperation in the
Railroad and Airline Industries, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 501, 551 (1989) (arguing that
"the pace of negotiations could be substantially increased by setting time limits on
the duration of NMB mediation, freeing the employer of its status quo obligation
and freeing the union to strike at an earlier stage in the bargaining process."). But
see Decision of D.C. Circuit in Teamsters Local 808 v. NMB, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 219, at D-1, D-3 (Nov. 15, 1989) (excellent account of the reasoning
behind leaving to the NMB an almost absolute discretion as to how long to pro-
long mediation).
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